Pricing and efficiency in wireless cellular data networks by Mukherjee, Shubham
Pricing and Efficiency in Wireless Cellular Data Networks
by
Shubham Mukherjee
B.S., Electrical Engineering (2003)
University of Illinois at Urbana / Champaign
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
May 2005
% 1 , ' £" ' ""f is
®Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.
Signature of Author . ....... .- -... ...-. . . .
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
May 12, 2005
Certified by ................. 
Asuman E. Ozdaalar
Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Thesis Supervisor
. In -_ .
Accepted by ....... .... ... .... . .... ... . ... . S m
Arthur C. Smith
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Theses
MASSACHUI
OF TE
OCT
LIBI
SETTS INSTnnTUTE
CHNOLOGY
212005
RARIES
A/CTta- + C C nnf ;_ ,-A Crl Fr;-ornr -- "+mllor Cr;a,
2
Pricing and Efficiency in Wireless Cellular Data
Networks
by
Shubham Mukherjee
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
on May 18, 2005 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Abstract:
In this thesis, we address the problem of resource allocation in wireless cellular networks
carrying elastic data traffic. A recent approach to the study of large scale engineering systems,
such as communication networks, has been to apply fundamental economic principles to un-
derstand how resources can be efficiently allocated in a system despite the competing interests
and selfish behavior of the users. The most common approach has been to assume that each
user behaves selfishly according to a payoff function, which is the difference between his utility
derived from the resources he is allocated, and the price charged by the network's manager.
The network manager can influence user behavior through the price, and thereby improve the
system's efficiency. While extensive analysis along these lines has been carried out for wireline
networks (see, for example, [10], [7], [23], [29], [21]), the wireless environment poses a host of
unique challenges.
Another recent line of research for wireline networks seeks to better understand how the
economic realities of data networks can impact the system's efficiency. In particular, authors
have considered the case where the network manager sets prices in order to maximize profits
rather than achieve efficient resource allocation; see [1] and references therein.
In this thesis, we make three contributions. Using a game theoretic framework, we show that
rate-based pricing can lead to an efficient allocation of resources in wireless cellular networks
carrying elastic traffic. Second, we use the game theoretic equilibrium notions as motivation for
a cellular rate control algorithm, and examine its convergence and stability properties. Third,
we study the impact of a profit-maximizing price setter on the system's efficiency. In particular,
we show the surprising result that for a broad class of utility functions, including logarithmic
and linear utilities, the profit maximizing price results in efficiency.
Thesis Supervisor: Asuman E. Ozdaglar
Title: Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Preliminaries
* 1.1 Motivation
In this thesis, we address the problem of resource allocation in wireless cellular networks
carrying elastic data traffic. A recent approach to the study of large scale engineering systems,
such as communication networks, has been to apply fundamental economic principles to un-
derstand how resources can be efficiently allocated in a system despite the competing interests
and selfish behavior of the users. Game theory (see [40]) is a natural mathematical framework
in this context. The most common approach has been to assume that each end-user behaves
selfishly according to a payoff function, which depends on the utility derived from the amount
of resources he is allocated, and the price charged by the network's manager. The network man-
ager can influence user behavior through the price, and thereby improve the system's efficiency.
This has proven to be a powerful methodology in the wireline networking community, and has
given rise to promising new frameworks of study such as (to name a few) "selfish routing" (see
[7]), the so-called "Kelly controllers" (see [23]), pricing based on duality (see [29]), and resource
allocation based on market mechanisms (see [21]).
While extensive analysis along these lines has been carried out for wireline networks, wireless
networks pose a host of unique challenges. As this thesis will show, several mathematical
difficulties arise when attempting to apply even the most basic results from the game theory
literature to a reasonable model for a wireless cellular network. This kind of challenge has
hindered the research community from making the same level of progress seen for wireline
networks.
Another recent line of research for wireline networks seeks to better understand how the eco-
nomic realities of data networks can impact the system's efficiency. In particular, authors have
9
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considered the case where the network manager sets prices in order to maximize profits rather
than achieve efficient resource allocation, and have studied the associated efficiency loss; see
[1] and references therein. Again, with few notable exceptions (such as [28]), profit-maximizing
pricing for wireless networks has received little attention in the literature.
In this thesis, we make three contributions. First, we show that usage-based pricing can
lead to an efficient allocation of resources in wireless cellular networks carrying elastic traffic.
Second, we use the game theoretic equilibrium notions as motivation for a cellular rate control
algorithm, and examine its convergence and stability properties. Finally, we study the impact of
a profit-maximizing price setter on the system's efficiency. In particular, we show the surprising
result that for a large class of utility functions, including logarithmic and linear utilities, profit-
maximizing pricing results in no efficiency loss.
* 1.2 Preliminaries for CDMA cellular systems
In this section, we briefly discuss some fundamental aspects of CDMA cellular systems to
motivate our model; see [16] for an overview, and [51] for thorough coverage. We also discuss
previous conventional approaches (those that do not employ pricing or game theoretic analysis)
to the problem of resource allocation in such systems. The following brief discussion on CDMA,
its technical merits, and important modelling issues can be found in [16].
Code division multiple access is one of the common multiple-access techniques in commu-
nication systems. It is known as a spread spectrum, or broadband, technique since, unlike
other common multiple access schemes such as frequency division multiple access (FDMA) or
time division multiple access (TDMA), the system's entire bandwidth is shared at all times
by all users. CDMA has numerous advantages which have led to its popularity. For example,
implementation issues are simplified, since there is no need to schedule time or frequency slots
as in TDMA or FDMA. Furthermore, CDMA has no hard constraint on the number of users
admissible to the system, unlike TDMA and FDMA, where the number of users is limited to
the number of time or frequency slots available.
The principle behind spread spectrum systems is that data is modulated over a large band-
10
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width using a binary pseudorandom sequence, also known as a spreading sequence or a signature,
before being transmitted. In order for the modulated signal to occupy the entire transmission
bandwidth, this spreading sequence should be like white Gaussian noise. For downlink trans-
mission (in which a central base station transmits data to each user), it seems reasonable to
assume that the base station can choose unique and orthogonal signatures for all users (assum-
ing that the number of users is less than the total number of orthogonal signature sequences
available), and transmit the modulated data in a synchronous fashion. In this setting, each
user can demodulate his received signal using his signature, and due to the orthogonality of
signature sequences, there will be no interference caused by signals intended for other users.
However, the number of possible signature sequences depends on the length of each signature
(a system parameter), and it is possible that there will be more users than available orthogo-
nal signatures. Furthermore, multipath distortion, a phenomenon inherent in wireless systems
whereby the receiver receives several delayed versions of a signal superimposed on eachother,
can eliminate the orthogonality property of the signature sequences. Finally, for uplink trans-
mission (in which each user has data to send to a central base station), it is not practical to
coordinate the transmissions to be synchronous. Therefore, especially for uplink transmission,
it is typically assumed that there is no correlation between the signature sequences of different
users.
This motivates the following formula for the signal to interference ratio yj for a user j; see
[15]:
W hpjj (1.2.1)
rj Eij hiPi a2
Here, user j transmits data to the base station with a data rate rj, power pj, channel gain hj,
and with a spreading gain of W. (Spreading gain refers to the length of the binary signature
sequence.) The quantity ifj hipi + ca2 is viewed as white Gaussian background noise by the
receiver, where a 2 is the system's background noise power.
11
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1.2.1 Measuring quality of service for systems carrying voice traffic
Early cellular systems only carried voice traffic, and transmitted data with a fixed rate of
data transmission. In this case, quality of service is characterized by the Signal to Interference
ratio (SIR) yj; see [15].
Because data for conversations must be transmitted in real time, the data must be sent
with little delay, implying that retransmissions cannot be used to improve quality of service.
Therefore, for voice traffic, acceptable communication is specified by some minimum SIR re-
quirement. So long as a user's SIR is above a certain threshold Tth, he will have an acceptable
quality of service. Because the rate of data transmission is fixed, resource allocation is solely a
transmission power control issue.
In light of this, many initial papers on CDMA power control deal with algorithms which
allocate powers to meet an SIR threshold for all users, and deny service to some users if this
objective is not feasible. One often considered class of algorithms that achieves this goal is SIR
balancing algorithms, also known as "max min" algorithms; see [2], [12], [13], [35], [36], [55].
These sought to give all users the highest attainable common SIR.
1.2.2 Cellular power control infrastructure
Early power control papers considered a model in which a central coordinator controls all of
the links from users to base stations in a system; see [55], [13]. However, such a controller would
have very high information requirements and would need to perform complex computations,
making this approach infeasible in practice. A more distributed approach, in which each base
station acts autonomously, was favored. The fundamental system architecture for power control
that was developed involved each base station tracking and updating the transmit powers of the
mobile devices within its cell. A benefit of this architecture is that, since each cell can be viewed
independently, when doing analysis one can restrict attention to single cell models without loss
of generality, which is the approach taken in this thesis. Iterative power control algorithms and
their convergence properties were studied; see, e.g., [12], [54], [56].
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1.2.3 Third Generation systems
In contrast to earlier systems, Third Generation CDMA systems support variable data rates
and support applications that are much more data-intensive than voice traffic. As a result, in
addition to transmission powers, transmission data rates represent another controllable resource;
see [42].
Furthermore, for non-real time applications such as file transfer, a user's quality of service is
not measured simply by his SIR, but instead by how fast data is transmitted to the base station
without error. To quantify this, authors have introduced the notions of efficiency functions and
effective data rates. An efficiency function f maps a user's SIR to a probability that a frame of
data will be successfully received by the base station.
f(-y) C [0,1] (1.2.2)
The specific form of the efficiency function depends on the modulation scheme and error cor-
rection codes employed; see, e.g., [11],[43],[37]. A user transmitting with data rate rj and SIR
-yj then has an effective data rate of
rjf(yj). (1.2.3)
Several approaches have been taken to consider resource allocation for third generation systems.
For example, in [47], the users transmit with various data rates, which remain fixed over time,
and an optimal power control scheme is derived to maximize the total effective data rate of
the terminals. However, this approach treats data rates as fixed, and not as a controllable
resource. In contrast, [22] treats both transmission powers and transmission data rates as
variables for optimization. The objectives considered were minimizing total transmission power
of the system, and minimizing total transmitted data rate of the system subject to constraints
on effective data rates. Finally, [38] considered the objective of maximizing the total effective
data rate of the system, optimizing over both rate and power.
1.2. Preliminaries for CDMA cellular systems 13
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* 1.3 Preliminaries for the application of game theory and pricing to wireless
networks
There is an extensive body of literature that applies pricing and game theoretic principles
to the analysis of wireline communication networks. However, as we will see in Chapter 2,
wireless networks present a host of unique challenges that primarily arise due to non-convexities
associated with the effective data rate function (1.2.3). As a first step, in this section, we discuss
how pricing is used in different contexts, requirements that a practical pricing scheme must
meet, and finally, discuss what constitutes a logical "resource" to price in the wireless setting.
Throughout, we discuss models considered by other authors.
Uses of pricing in different contexts:
1. Economic: A service provider implements pricing in order to recoup the costs of running
a network, and typically tries to maximize his revenue.
2. Differentiated Service: Users can pay different amounts to get varying qualities of service.
This enables a network to satisfy heterogeneous users with various demands (i.e. various
utility functions), who are transmitting data with various resource requirements.
3. Congestion Control: Prices are used as control parameters, and are employed to induce
users into an efficient usage of a network's limited resources.
While these issues have been studied extensively for the case of wireline networks (see
[10] for a survey), only limited work has been done for wireless networks. In fact, research
that involves pricing has almost exclusively focused on Pricing Motivation 3 above, neglecting
Pricing Motivations 1 and 2.
A pricing scheme should also satisfy practical requirements regarding its implementation.
Pricing requirements:
1. Simple pricing structure: the pricing scheme should be easy for consumers to grasp, and
for service providers to implement.
14
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2. Consistent with current standards: the pricing scheme should fit in with current network
infrastructure and standards.
Several pricing schemes have been considered in the literature. We can examine these
schemes with the above considerations in mind.
1.3.1 Pricing power usage
Recall that a user's SIR is adversely affected by the transmission power of other users (1).
With this in mind, almost all previous models have considered usage-based pricing schemes
that are linear functions of a user's power usage; see, for example, [3], [18], [24], [25], [43], [53].
Letting q denote the unit price for power, we have
price = qpj.
However, two issues arise with this pricing scheme. First, pricing the power implies that users
will choose their own transmission power, which leads to a fully-distributed power control sys-
tem. Recall that this model goes against the existing and well-studied cellular power control
infrastructure, in which a base station coordinates the transmission powers of all the users in
the cell; see Section 1.2. Therefore, this pricing mechanism is not compatible with existing
standards and infrastructure (see Pricing Requirement 2).
Furthermore, power is an abstract quantity to price. A typical consumer may not understand
this pricing method, and this violates Pricing Requirement 1.
For these reasons, many of the papers listed above use their pricing mechanisms as a starting
point to develop new distributed algorithms that are a departure from the current cellular
infrastructure. In contrast, this thesis seeks to use pricing as a means for congestion control
within the cellular framework.
15
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1.3.2 SIR based pricing
In [45], a different view is taken. Here, it is noted that the following is a fundamental system
constraint for uplink data transmission:
Z rjj < W.
See [45], [46], [16]. This constraint is interpreted to mean that rjyj represents the fundamental
resource usage of user j in the CDMA uplink, and therefore a natural pricing mechanism will
be a linear function of this quantity. Letting q represent the unit price, we have
price = qrjyj.
In [19], an auction based algorithm is proposed in which each user is charged a price that is
linear in his SIR.
price = qyj.
Although it is shown that such pricing schemes have desirable congestion control properties,
they are abstract quantities to price (see Pricing Requirement 1).
1.3.3 Pricing rate
A pricing mechanism that has not, to our knowledge, been considered in previous models
is the usage-based pricing of the data transmission rate. Letting q represent the unit price, we
have
price = qrj. (1.3.1)
If one assumes that, given the data rates that users select, the base station manages power con-
trol issues, then this pricing mechanism fits in very well with the existing cellular infrastructure,
and satisfies our Pricing Requirements. This is the pricing scheme we consider in this thesis.
16
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* 1.4 Modeling user behaviour
In the game theoretic literature, user behavior is commonly modelled through the use of a
utility function defined over the amount of resource assigned to the user. Ideally, a users utility
function will reflect the fact that a user's utility depends on some measurable performance cri-
teria, such as the delay the user's packets incur between transmission and reception. Defining
utilities in this matter can lead to complexities, and therefore in the literature, utility func-
tions are defined over the underlying resource that dictates the performance metrics. However,
because third generation wireless systems carry various types of data whose quality of service
depends on various parameters, it is not clear what this resource should be.
1.4.1 Utility functions for inelastic traffic
Examples of inelastic traffic, defined in [44] as traffic that is not tolerant to delay variations,
include voice and real-time streams. User satisfaction for this type of traffic is characterized in a
binary fashion: either the connection is acceptable, or it is not. Whether or not it is acceptable
depends on whether the user's SIR is above a threshold 7th. Therefore, an appropriate utility
function for voice users should depend only on the user's SIR, and should be a step function;
see [11], [44], and Figure 1.
Utility
'th r
Figure 1-1: The utility function for users sending voice traffic.
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1.4.2 Utility functions for elastic data traffic
A more complex issue is how to characterize the utility of users sending elastic data traffic,
which will be the focus of this thesis. Elastic traffic, defined in [44], refers to traffic that
is tolerant to delay variations, such as file transfer or ordinary web browsing. A common
assumption for utility functions of such traffic is that they are increasing, concave functions of
their throughput. These assumptions are natural; the first says that more throughput yields
more utility, and the second says that users get diminishing marginal returns for marginal
increases in throughput.
Utility
throughput
Figure 1-2: The utility function for users sending elastic traffic.
Recall that the achieved throughput of a data user is given by his effective data rate (cf.
1.2.3). Therefore, in [45] and [24], it is assumed that users derive utility from their effective
data rate, giving a utility of uj(rjf(fyj)) for user j. This is the approach we follow in this thesis.
1.4.3 Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is a quantifiable characteristic of utility functions. Intuitively, it is a measure
of how much a user prefers a particular expected payoff with certainty over the same expected
payoff with uncertainty. In this section, we interpret the two measures of risk aversion, absolute
risk aversion and relative risk aversion, that are used in this thesis. In the following, we give
some main ideas from [4], which provides a thorough coverage of risk aversion.
18
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Suppose an individual receives an amount x > 0 of some finite resource, and suppose his
preferences over x are described by a utility function u : R + R +. Assume that u is an
increasing, concave function. In loose terms, the individual is risk averse at x if he prefers to
receive an amount x of the resource with certainty rather than : - 6 with probability ½ and
x ±- 6 with probability . It can be shown that strict concavity of the utility function implies
that the individual will be risk averse for all x. There are two commonly used metrics used to
quantify risk aversion.
The first is known as absolute risk aversion, and is defined by
U"(x)A(x) - u'(x) (1.4.1)
For a simple interpretation, suppose the individual has an amount x of the resource. He is
offered a bet in which he can increase his amount of the resource to x + 6 with probability 7r, or
suffer a loss reducing his amount of the resource to x - 6 with probability (1 - 7r). For 7r = 1,
clearly he will accept the bet, and for r = 0, he will reject it. It seems reasonable to quantify
the risk aversion of the individual by the value of 7 for which he is just indifferent to accepting
or rejecting the bet. Let 7r(x, 6) denote this value of 7r (it can be shown that such a value is
guaranteed to exist, and is unique). It can be shown (see [4]) that for 6 << 1, r(x, 6) can be
approximated as
((, 6) = + 0(62),
2 4
where 0(62) represents terms of higher order in 6. Thus, we see that absolute risk aversion can
be interpreted as being related to the premium in expected return that the individual demands
in order to accept uncertainty in his payoff.
The second common measure of risk aversion is relative risk aversion, and is defined by
R(x)_-x 
To interpret this, consider the same bet considered above, with the difference that the individual
can win or lose an amount 6x that is proportional to his current wealth; i.e., he will either end
1.5. Quniyn Efiiny2
with x + 6x or x - 6x. For << 1, just as above, we can obtain the approximation
ir(2, x)= I+ + O(2)
2 4
Thus, relative risk aversion can be interpreted as being related to the premium in expected
return that the individual demands in order to accept uncertainty in his payoff, where the
premium is scaled by his current wealth.
Relative risk aversion plays a significant role in a central result of this thesis. In particular,
we will show that if the relative risk aversion Rj(x) is less than 1 for all users, and for all
x, then the rate-based price which leads to an efficient allocation of resources is equivalent to
the rate-based price that would be charged by a profit-maximizing service provider. Absolute
risk aversion plays an important role in framing various results in this thesis in a physically
interpretable form.
* 1.5 Quantifying Efficiency
In order to study the impact of pricing on efficiency, one needs to have well-defined and
quantifiable measures of efficiency. While there are many notions of efficiency in the literature,
the following are natural for elastic traffic:
Let J denote the set of users, indexed by j.
Definition 1. Given some fixed power allocation scheme, a throughput maximizing rate allo-
cation is a rate vector r* that maximizes the total effective data rate of the system.
c argmax {ZJ(½)}. (1.5.1)r* E arg max y rjf('Tj)).
Definition 2. Given some fixed power allocation scheme, a rate vector r* is a Pareto efficient
solution if there exists no other rate vector r such that uj(rjf(yj)) > uj(r*f(-yj*)), V j E J and
uj(rjf( j)) > uj(rjf(yj*)) for some j E J.
These are the two notions of efficiency that we will study in this thesis. Maximizing the
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total effective data rate of the system is a primary efficiency objective from an engineering
perspective; when the objective in Definition 1 is satisfied, there is no outcome which can
result in a higher utilization of the system. Pareto efficiency is a primary efficiency objective
from a social perspective. When the objective in Definition 2 is satisfied, one cannot find a
redistribution of resources which benefits some user without hurting some other user.
* 1.6 Contributions of this thesis
In this thesis, we make three contributions. First, we show that usage-based pricing can
lead to an efficient allocation of resources in wireless cellular networks carrying elastic traffic.
Second, we use the game theoretic equilibrium notions as motivation for a cellular rate control
algorithm, and examine its convergence and stability properties. Third, we study the impact of
a profit-maximizing price setter on the system's efficiency. We show the surprising result that
for a large class of utility functions, a profit-maximizing price leads to efficiency.
In Chapter 2, we define a game theoretic framework which will form the basis of our study.
We show the existence of a Nash equilibrium for any price q, and in doing so deal with the non-
convexities associated with utility functions in the wireless setting that have posed challenges
in the research of wireless networks. We then employ limiting arguments to show that the
Nash equilibrium can be approximated by a more tractable equilibrium notion in which an
individual's unilateral change in action has a negligible impact on the overall system. This
equilibrium notion is similar to the Wardrop equilibrium, first introduced in congestion analysis
for transportation networks. We guarantee the existence of a price for which there exists an
efficient equilibrium, and refer to this price as a Pigovian tax.
In Chapter 3, we examine stability properties of the Wardrop Equilibrium of Chapter 2. We
use this as motivation for a congestion control algorithm based on the Wardrop Equilibrium,
and study its convergence.
In Chapter 4, we consider the case of a profit-maximizing price setter. We characterize the
resulting equilibrium. We then show the surprising result that for a large class of user utility
functions, including logarithmic and linear utilities, the profit maximizing price is equal to the
Pigovian tax.
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* 1.7 Notation
Scalars and Vectors
We denote by R the set of real scalars. We denote by IR+ the set of real and nonnegative
scalars: R + = {x C RIx > 0}.
We denote by R n the set of n-dimensional real vectors. For any x C RIn, we use xi to indicate
its ith component. Vectors in R n will be viewed as column vectors. If x cG I n = (x 1, ..., xn), then
we will use x-i to denote the components of x other than xi; i.e., x-i = (x, ..., xi, xi+l, ... , Xn)
If f : MRn R is a function of n scalars xl,..., x,, we let f(xi; xl) denote the function f as a
function of xi while keeping the components x-_i fixed.
Sequences
We denote a sequence of scalars, indexed by n, as {x(n)}. The sequence is said to converge
if there exists a scalar x such that for every e > 0, we have Ix(n) - xl < e for every n greater
than some integer N. The Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, used later in this thesis, states the
following:
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem: A bounded sequence in RIn has at least one limit point.
If a sequence {x(n)} converges to a limit point x, we write x(n) - x.
The remainder of the notation used in this thesis is either explained within the document,
or is self-evident.
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Chapter 2
Wardrop Equilibrium for rate selection in
wireless data networks
* 2.1 Model and Framework
We consider a single cell CDMA network, and focus on uplink data transmission. The cell
consists of one base station, operated by a service provider, and J users attempting to send
data to the base station. Let J denote the set of users.
User j transmits data to the base station with a data rate rj, with power pj, and with a
spreading gain of W. The system bandwidth is therefore W. We assume that each user has a
maximum transmission power of Pma,. Let r G R J and p E RJ denote the vectors of rates and
powers, respectively. We also let R = j rj denote the sum rate of all users in the system.
User j's signal experiences a path loss of hj. We assume there is a total background noise
power of ac2 at the base station. Based on these parameters, user j's signal quality is quantified
through his Signal to Interference Ratio (SIR)1 yj, where
W hjpj
rj -ioj hiPi + 2 ' (2.11)
(See [15], [16]). We assume J and W are large, so the contribution of an individual interferer is
negligible. Then, (2.1.1) can be approximated as
1 A different convention is to refer to this quantity as the bit energy to noise density ratio E, in which case
hjpj
>ifj hiPi + a2
is referred to as the SIR.
23
2.1. Model and Framework
W hjpji rj EiE hipi + 2 (2.1.2)
This type of approximation is used and justified in [16]. User j sends data to the base
station in frames consisting of M bits, where M > 1. The probability that a frame transmitted
by user j can be decoded by the base station without error is quantified by a function of yj.
We denote this function by f(yj), and refer to it as the efficiency function. The notion of the
efficiency function has been well studied; see, e.g., [11],[37],[38],[43],[45]. The system's efficiency
function depends on the modulation scheme, which dictates the bit error rate BER, and the
error correction codes employed. A crude system with bit error rate Pe will have an efficiency
of (1 - Pe)M; error correction codes will result in a more complicated expression. Below are
examples of simple efficiency functions for various modulation schemes (see [43]), and the reader
is referred to [11] for efficiency functions that incorporate error correction coding.
Modulation Scheme Bit Error Rate Efficiency function
1. DPSKe- (1 - e-)M
2. Non-coherent FSK le 2 (1 -e)M2 2
3. BPSK Q((2y)) (1- Q((2y) )) M
4. Coherent FSK Q((y) ) (1-Q((y)2))M
Table 1: Efficiency functions for some simple system implementations.
We make only the following general assumptions on the system's efficiency function, which
hold for typical modulation schemes and error correction codes, including those discussed above.
Assumption 1: The efficiency function f: [0, oc) - [0, 1) satisfies the following conditions
(see Figure 2-1):
1. f is a strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable function of y,
2. lim--o f () = 0,
3. limb-o f'(y) = 0,
4. There exists y such that V 7 < y, f('y) is strictly convex, and V y > ty, f(-y) is strictly
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concave,
5. Let C c R +, and let h(x) = f(+cx). There exists such that V x < , h(x) is strictly
convex, and V x > x;, h(x) is strictly concave,
6. All users have the same efficiency function f(-).
Figure 2-1: The general form for the efficiency function f(y), as a function of the signal quality
-y. The point where f(-y) = yf'(y) is considered later in the thesis.
Assumptions 1.1 - 1.4 are natural for efficiency functions, and they can be seen by inspection
of Figure 1. We note that Assumption 1.5 is a generalization of 1.4. Assumption 1.5 holds for
all commonly considered efficiency functions, including those given in Table 1, with or without
error correction codes; this can be proven for some classes of efficiency functions and shown
by simulation for others where a proof is not tractable due to the complicated closed form ex-
pressions of their efficiency functions. Appendix B shows why Assumption 1.5 is necessary, and
proves it for efficiency functions with bit error rates that are exponentially decaying functions of
the SIR. Finally, Assumption 1.6 states that all users employ the same modulation scheme and
error correction code. Since error correction decoding is done at the receiver, and all users are
transmitting to the same base station, it is reasonable to assume that the same error correction
coding will be used by all users. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to assume that all users
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transmitting data to the same base station are using the same protocol, and thus will be using
the same modulation scheme.
User j's effective data rate is given by rjf(yj). We assume that user j derives a utility of
uj(rjf(-j)) based on his effective data rate.
Assumption 2: Assume that for each j, the utility function uj : R + -- R+ satisfies the
following conditions:
1. uj is a strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable function.
2. uj is strictly concave.
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are natural in the context of a data network. 2.1 says that users derive
more utility from a higher effective data rate. 2.2, which is appropriate for elastic data traffic,
says that higher effective data rates have diminishing marginal returns for users; see [44].
The service provider derives a profit of qrj from each user j by collecting a payment q per
each unit of data rate rj. User j's payoff is given by his utility less his total payment:
uj(rjf(yj)) - qrj. (2.1.3)
The following game will be the basis of our study.
Definition 3. The Rate Selection Game has J players, consisting of the set of users J, who
act according to the following utilities and strategy spaces.
User stage: Given a price q, each user j chooses rj to maximize his payoff.
max uj(rjf (yj)) -qrj. (2.1.4)
rj>O
Power control stagel: Given the rate vector r determined in the User Stage, the base station
assigns the transmit powers p according to the following objective:
max min j.
O<p<pmaz 3
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(2.1.5)
2.2. Power Control Solution
The equilibrium notion we will use is the Nash Equilibrium, which we now define (see [40]).
Definition 4. (Nash Equilibrium) Let r_j denote the vector of rates (rl,..., rj_, rj+l, ..., rJ).
A Nash Equilibrium of the Rate Selection Game under price q is a vector r* > 0 such that for
all j
uj (rj*f (y (rj; r* j))) - qrj > uj(rjf (-(Tj; r* j))) - qj, for all Tj > 0.
A Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile r* in which no player can increase his payoff with
a unilateral change in strategy.
* 2.2 Power Control Solution
In this section, we characterize the power control objective (2.1.5). We will use this char-
acterization to prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium of the Rate Selection Game. It has
been shown in [13], [35], and [55] that the "max-min" power control objective results in all
users transmitting with the same SIR; hence, this objective is also known as SIR balancing.
Furthermore, if user j has an SIR yj under a power allocation p, he will have a higher SIR when
all components of the power vector are scaled up uniformly; this is the scalability property of
standard interference functions, defined in [28]. From this, it follows that some user must be
allocated P,,,,a. The following proposition formalizes these results in the context of our model
and assumptions, and also provides a complete characterization of the power control objective
(2.1.5).
Proposition 1. For a rate vector r, let p* be an optimal solution of problem (2.1.5), and let
- be the corresponding SIR for user i. Then, y =j= - y*, V i, j CE . Furthermore,
W
'k= , Z (2.2.1)
rkrOk + rj
where 7rk = d2 and k = arg min { }h
'The max-min power control described above, also known as SIR-balancing, is well studied and commonly
considered as discussed in Section 1.2. Other power control methods could have been used in the power control
stage. For example, a typical scheme is ensuring that each user's SIR yj is above some threshold; this is generally
used for real-time traffic due to its strict BER requirements. However, in this paper we are focusing on the
transmission of elastic data traffic. In this context, the max-min fair power control scheme is the most logical.
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Proof: First, we show that yi* = yj*, V i,j C J. To find a contradiction, suppose that all users
do not have the same SIR. Let M = arg minj{fyj}. Then there exists i such that
W hipi W hmPm Vm E 
ri -jEJ hjpZj* + 2 rm j hjp* + au2'
which implies that there exists some 6 > 0 such that
W hi(p - 6) W hmPm W hmPmi -> > V mE JM.
ri ZEj hjpj* -hi6 + a2 rm j hjp h6hi- + 2 rm Ej hp+j* +2 ' m
(2.2.2)
Therefore, the power allocation of p* - 6ei, where ei is the i t h unit vector, contradicts the
optimality of p*.
We claim that pj* = Pmax for some j E 5. To find a contradiction, suppose pj < Pmax, for all
j c ,. Then, there exists a scalar a > 1 such that apj* < Pmax, for all j. The power allocation
ap* increases ?j, for all j, contradicting the optimality of p*.
Next, we claim that p = Pma,, where k = argminj{.i Denote the total interference
experienced by each user as
I = hipi + 2.
iEJ
To find a contradiction, let Pm = Pmax, where m $ k. Then
hm hk
rm rk
from which we obtain
W hmPmax > W hkpmax W hkp*
rm I rk I rk I
It follows that yk ym, which is a contradiction, so Pm Pmax. Since some user must be
allocated Pmax, we have p* = Pmax. Since the SIR for all users must be equal, we have the
following:
W hkPmax W hjp(
rk r V j. (2.2.3)
This implies
hk rj
pi* =- hk Pmax, j,
rk hj ax
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and also
hjpj = y*I, V j.
Using the preceding relation, and the definition of I, we have
I 2 + E hjpj = a
Substituting this into (2.2.3), we have* WhkPmax (
r Fk 02 W 
Solving for 'y*, we have
WhkPmaz
rkcr2 + hkPmax E rj
which, by the definition of r1 k, can be expressed as
W
* w
rkrlk + E r
For the remainder of the thesis, y will denote to the common SIR experienced by all users
due to the power control objective (2.1.5). In some cases, to emphasize that the SIR under the
max-nmin power control objective (2.1.5) is a function of only r, we will use the notation 'y(r).
* 2.3 Equilibrium characterization
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the Rate Selection Game. We establish the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. We then show that for a large number of users J and bandwidth
W, the Nash Equilibrium can be approximated by another equilibrium notion that is both
intuitively appealing and mathematically tractable. Motivated by the Wardrop Equilibrium
used in the transportation network literature to model user behavior in a system with a large
number of users (see [17] and [52] ), we define this equilibrium as the Wardrop Equilibrium. We
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show that it may not be unique, but give properties which will be useful to show uniqueness for
the extensive game considered in Chapter 4. The definitions of a quasiconcave function and a
Nash equilibrium, terms which are used in this section, are given in Appendix A.
2.3.1 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
In order to show existence of a Nash Equilibrium, we will show that the utility function
uj(rjf(y(r))) is a quasiconcave function of rj for all j. Existence of an equilibrium will then
follow by Kakutani's fixed point theorem (see Appendix A).
Proposition 2. User j's utility function uj(rjf(-y(r))) is a quasiconcave function of rj.
Proof: The proof consists of four steps.
Step 1: rjf (W) has a unique global maximum at r* = argmax{rjf(w) ) , is strictly increasing
for rj < rj*, and strictly decreasing for rj > rj.
Proof: Let x = W. All stationary points of rjf(x) must satisfy
Or rjf ( ) } = f() - xf'(x) = 0.
The condition f(x) = xf'(x) corresponds to the tangent of the line passing through the origin
with the f(x) curve; see Figure 2-1. This was observed in [45]. The strict concavity in Assump-
tion 1.4 implies that the corresponding tangent point must exist. Assumptions 1.2, 1.3, and
the strict concavity of 1.4 imply that the tangent point must be unique. (We note that x = 0
is not a possibility. This is because rj < oc, a fact which will be made clear in the analysis of
Proposition 3).
Denote the value at which the tangent occurs as x*. Since x = W is strictly decreasing in
rj, there exists a unique rj satisfying x* = W. We also have
O2 x{rf(x ) = Xf"(X)-Or r
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Because x > and rj > 0, this implies the following equivalence:
02
Or {rjf(x)} < ° f"(x) < o.
Therefore, rf( ) is concave if and only if f(x) is concave at x = . Assumptions 1.2 and 1.3
imply that the tangent point must occur in the concave region of f(x). Thus, the stationary
point r* is a local maximum, and since it is a unique stationary point, it is the global maximum.
This implies that rjf(W) is increasing for rj < r and decreasing for rj > r (see Figure 2-2 for
the general functional form). O
rif( )
'r
Figure 2-2: The functional form of rjf(fw) for typical f(.).
Step 2: rjf( C), where C1 R+ is an arbitrary constant, has a unique global maximum at
* = argmax rjf( )}, is strictly increasing for rj < rj, and strictly decreasing for rj > rj*.
Proof: Again, let x = W. Let C = c, and define the function f: IR+ -- IR+ to be:
N ttr w f( 1 + Ct
Note that for x = W, we haver +
f(x) f rj + C (2-3.1)
2.3. Equilibrium characterization 31
2.3. Equilibrium characterization
The following three properties are also satisfied:
{ f x cx C , Vx,
Ox 1 + CXJ 1 q+Cx 1 + Cx (1 + Cx)2
( x+C)=o for x= 0,
lim a f =limf, X ) c 1 CX)2
x-o x {x 1 + CX 1 + C (1 C)2 0.
Therefore, f(x) satisfies Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. Furthermore, Assumption 1.5 implies
that f(x) satisfies Assumption 1.4. Therefore, all of the assumptions used in Step 1 hold, and
due to (2.3.1), the result of Step 1 will apply to rjf(rW). O
Step 3: rf (C2rW l ), where C1, C2 C 1 + are arbitrary constants, has a unique global maxi-
mum at r = argmax{rjf(c2r W )}, is strictly increasing for rj < r, and strictly decreasing
for rj > rj.
Proof: By Step 2, these conditions hold for the function rj f ( W). Scaling the domain by
C2, we get C2rjf ( C  , l )'
Scaling the range by C2, we get
f WJfCrj + C1)
The results of Step 2 are preserved by these transformations. [1
Step 4: Let r_j denote the vector of rates (r, ... , rj-1, rj+l, ..., rJ). Using (2.2.1), denote user
j's effective data rate, as a function of rj with r_j held fixed, as
g(rj;r-j) = rjf (rklk + ieJri)
Then g(rj;r_j) is a continuous function of rj which has a unique global maximum at rj* =
argmax{g(rj; rj)}, is strictly increasing for rj < r, and strictly decreasing for rj > r*
Proof: Recall
k arg min { h i l 2
z ri hkPmax
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We have
· Wy(rj; r-j) -- rk)rk + .ieJ ri (2.3.2)
Note that there exists a value rj such that for rj < r, j y~ k, and for rj > rj, j = k. For rj < r
and rj > r, g(rj; r_j) is continuous. For rj = r_, we have
j~argmin hi}.i="p~Y( g i iE{i }
By the definition of user k,
k=argmin( hi
iE J ri }
This gives
hj hk (2.3.3)
rj rk
which implies
rjrj = rk7k. (2.3.4)
(In the case where rj = rj, there are two users satisfying argminiEj{h}; to avoid ambiguity,
in (2.3.3) and (2.3.4) we have let k 4 j denote the user who also satisfies this for rj < rj).
It follows that
lim -y(rj;rj)= lim (rj;rj),
r r- r3 +
and therefore
lim g(rj; r_j) = lim g(rj; r_j),
l- - rjlr
so g(rj; r_j) is continuous everywhere.
At rj, the derivative of g(rj, rj) is discontinuous. Because rlk > 0, (2.3.2) implies
a a{(rr-j)}lr- >  Yrjr-j)}lrj+,
from which it follows that
a0 a
arj 3 arj 3
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For rj < rj, let
C1 = ri + rkk, C2 = 1,
i7j
and for rj > r , let
C1 = ri, C2 = (1 + qj).
i5j
With these identifications, we see that g(rj; rj) is a continuous function with a single discon-
tinuity in its derivative at rj, and it takes the functional form given in Step 3 for both rj < r'
and rj > rj. There are 2 cases to consider:
The first case is if g(rj,r_j) is decreasing at r-. By Step 3 there exists some such
that g(rj,r_j) is increasing for rj < rj, and decreasing for rj C (rj,r). By Equation (2.3.6),
g(rj, r_j) will be decreasing at r+ , and by Step 3 it will be decreasing for all rj > rj; see Figure
3-3a.
The second case is if g(r j , rj) is increasing at r-. By Step 2 it is increasing for rj < r.
There are two subcases.
By Equation (2.3.6), g(rj, r_j) may be decreasing at rj r+. In this subcase, we let rj* = rj
and by Step 3, g(rj, r_j) will be decreasing for all rj > rj; see Figure 3-3b.
The second subcase is if g(rj, r_j) is increasing at r + . By Step 3 there exists some r* such
that g(rj , rj) will be increasing for rj < rj* and decreasing for rj > rj; see Figure 3-3c.
In either case, g(rj , r_j) has a unique global maximum r*, is strictly increasing for rj < r*,
and strictly decreasing for rj > r .
Step 5: uj(rjf(y(r))) is a quasiconcave function of rj.
Proof: Because uj is a strictly increasing function, uj(rjf(y(r)) is strictly increasing for
rj < r, and strictly decreasing for rj > rj*. Therefore, it is quasiconcave. O
Proposition 3. There exists a Nash Equilibrium of the Rate Selection Game.
Proof: The utility functions uj are continuous in r. By Proposition 2, they are quasiconcave
in r. We next show that the action spaces of the users are restricted to a nonempty, convex,
compact set, and then the existence of a Nash Equilibrium will follow from Kakutani's fixed
34
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3 3
Figure 2-.3: The form of g(rj; rj)
Ir = Jf 7'i r*fr ecothcsdiue i ri
for each of the cases discussed in Proposition 2, Step 4.
point theorem. Consider some user j. By Proposition 2, given any r_j, there exists a unique,
finite optimal value for the objective
max {uj (rjf(-y(rj; r_j)) }.
r 3 > 0
Take the maximum of this over all r_j, and denote the maximizing value by Uj,max:
Uj,max = max max{ uj (rjf (y(rj; r-j))}}.r-j rj O
It follows that
uj(rjf(-y)) < Uj,ma x, V r.
This implies that for any price q and any r_j, there exists some rate rj,max for which
uj(rjf (y)) - qrj < 0, V rj > rj,max.
Since user j can attain a payoff of 0 by transmitting at rate rj = 0, it follows that user j's rate rj
at a Nash Equilibrium must lie in the compact, convex interval [0, rj,max]. A Nash Equilibrium
exists by Kakutani's fixed point theorem. [
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2.3.2 Large System Convergence of the Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce the Wardrop Equilibrium by considering the Nash Equilibrium
of Section 2.3.1 in the large system limit.
As a motivation for pursuing the Wardrop Equilibrium, consider the following necessary
first order optimality conditions for a Nash Equilibrium, given for each user i k,
u'(rif( )) f(-Y) - ) (rrk + j)2 = q, ri > 0, (2.3.7)
< q, ri = 0,
(2.3.8)
and for user k,
u(rkf(})) [f(-y) - rif'() W(rk) += q, rk > 0, (2.3.9)
<q, rk = 0.
(2.3.10)
The Nash Equilibrium is an appealing equilibrium concept in situations where a user's
choice of actions impacts the system's parameters and thereby the behavior of other users, such
as the wireless system we are considering here. As shown by (2.3.7) and (2.3.9), the Nash
Equilibrium approach explicitly shows how user j's decision on whether to change his strategy
depends on the actions of the other users, as well as the impact that this change will have on the
system's SIR. However, the Nash Equilibrium approach gives rise to several difficulties. First,
as can be seen by (2.3.7) and (2.3.9), the Nash Equilibrium has a cumbersome mathematical
characterization which leads to computational difficulties. Secondly, (2.3.7) and (2.3.9) depend
on quantities such as the data rates of all users and the derivative of the efficiency function.
Therefore, users have extensive information requirements in order to determine whether their
first order optimality condition is satisfied.
However, if we restrict our attention to a many user, large bandwidth system, it seems
reasonable to consider a more tractable equilibrium concept in which one user's unilateral
36
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change in strategy has a negligible impact on the overall system. This motivates us to pursue
an equilibrium notion along the lines of the Wardrop Equilibrium, first introduced in congestion
analysis for transportation networks, in which the routing decisions of a single user are assumed
to have a negligible impact on link congestion in a network; see [52] and [17]. Such an approach
is intuitively justified in our case by observing the additive structure of the denominator in
(2.2.1); if J is large, then a change in rj for any user j will have a negligible impact on .
Therefore, one expects users to view y as a constant when considering unilateral changes in
their strategy. With such an equilibrium notion, one expects lower information requirements
for each user to determine an optimal strategy. In fact, Chapter 3 presents a dynamic system
based on the Wardrop Equilibrium in which users determine their strategy based only on the
observed SIR y, and local stability results are given for the system.
In order to formalize the Wardrop Equilibrium in our context, we use large system analysis,
which is a common technique in characterizing CDMA systems. In such analysis, the number
of users J and the system bandwidth W are both taken to infinity, but their ratio is held to a
constant ; see, e.g., [16] and references therein.
In order to characterize the large system limit while maintaining mathematical structure, we
use a replication argument, first employed by Debreu and Scarf [9] in the context of competitive
equilibria in exchange economies and also used in [17]. In such an argument, one considers
an "increasing sequence of systems" in which the nth system is constructed from the (n - l)th
system by scaling it in a symmetric fashion. In particular, the system's bandwidth is scaled
from (n- 1)W to nW, and J users are added to the system, where the jth new user has a utility
function identical to the jth user of the original system. Replication arguments have previously
been used in the analysis of other engineering systems, such as traffic systems [52] and wireline
data networks [1]. Thus, we are using a replication argument commonly used in the economic
modelling of large scale systems and economies as a tool in performing the large system analysis
commonly used in the characterization of CDMA systems.
Formally, we consider a sequence of games G(n). Define the game G(n) to be the Rate
Selection Game with J classes of users, l, ...,A , with n users in each class. Assume that all
members of class .j have the same utility function uj. We denote the set of users in game G(n)
by (n), and note that there are nJ users in (n). To maintain the constant of proportionality
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I= W(n) , we let W(n) = nW. Finally, a user m J(n) transmits with rate rm(n).
The SIR in game G(n), given by (2.2.1), is then
nW
rk (n)rk + Ej meNj rm(n)' (2.3.11)
The payoff in game G(n) to user i is
ui(ri(n)f((n))) - qri(n). (2.3.12)
Proposition 4. Let r(n) and y(n) be a Nash Equilibrium rate vector and SIR for the game
G(n) under price q, and assume that rm(n) > 0 for some m. Then, we have
lim rj(n) = rj, (2.3.13)
n-oo
lim y(n) = y, (2.3.14)
n-oo
where
W
EjEiJ rij
and r C IRJ and iy C R satisfy
u'j(rjf(y))f(y) = q, rj > 0, (2.3.15)
< q, rj = O.
Proof: First, we argue that the sequences {ri(n)} and {y(n)} have limits. By the analysis
of Proposition 3, the Nash Equilibrium rate ri(n) must lie in the compact interval [0, ri,max].
By the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem (see Section 1.7), {rj(n)} has a convergent subsequence.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume ri(n) -- ri for all i E J(n). Since rm(n) > 0
for some m by assumption, it follows from (2.3.11) that there exists 'Ymax such that 'y(n) i< Ymax
Furthermore, there exists ymin such that y(n) > ymin, where Ymin is (2.3.11) evaluated at
ri = ri,max for all i. Therefore, y(n) lies in a compact interval for all n, {y(n)} has a convergent
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subsequence by the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, and without loss of generality we can assume
y(n) - y.
In order to prove (2.3.15), we will consider the following first order necessary user optimality
condition for a Nash Equilibrium, which must be satisfied for all i CG (n).
u'i(ri(n)f(-y(n))) [f(y(n)) + ri(n) ( r() {f  q, r(n))) > O,
< q, ri(n) = O.
In order to simplify this expression, we first show that
ri(n) = rj(n) V i,j E Im, i # k, j k, V m, (2.3.16)
(i.e., with the possible exception of user k, all users in the same class transmit with the same
rate at the Nash equilibrium). To find a contradiction, suppose ri(n) < rj(n). We have
ui(ri(n)f(y(n))) [f(-y(n)) + r(i) (n) {f(-(n))})] <
uj (rj(n)f (y())) [f((n))+rj(n) rn(n)))
By Assumption 2.2, and since i and j have the same utility function, we have ui(ri(n)f(y(n))) >
(rj (n) f (y (n))). This implies
f (r (n)) + ri(n) ( ar() {f(-y(n))}) < f(-y(n)) + rj(n) (Or (n) {f((n))}) 
and therefore
ri(n) ( If(r-(n) {f((n))  < rj(n) r(n) {f(7(n))})
By inspection of (2.3.11), it is clear that arn) {f(-y(n))} =arn) {f(y(n))} as long as i 
k, j $4 k. Since r- {f (y(n))} < 0, we have ri > rj, a contradiction. A symmetric argument
holds for ri > rj.
Using (2.3.16), we can simplify (2.3.11). Denote ri(n) for any i G Afj such that i k by
39
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rv (n), for all j. Without loss of generality, let k c Ak. We have
nW
(n) rk(n)7k + n -jfkr j(n) + (n - l)rrk (n) + rk(n)' (2.3.17)
Using (2.3.17), we can write the first order optimality condition for all users. If i k, by taking
the derivative of (2.3.12), we have
(2.3.18)ui(ri(n)f(-y(n)) ) x
Lf("(n)) in)f('y ))(rk(n)?k + n -jok rj (n) + (n - 1)rgk (n) + rk(n))2
<q, rj(n) = 0.
If i = k, the first order optimality condition is
ui(ri(n)f(-y(n)) ) x
[f((n)) - ri(n)f '(7(n)) k + n j nW(1 + Tk)/L-/(n))- ri~n) f' ("/(n)(rk(n)r/k + n jok rvj (n) + (n - 1)rVk (n)+ rk(n))2
(2.3.19)
=q, rj(n) > 0,
<q, rj(n) = 0.
Consider the sequences given in the LHS of (2.3.18) and (2.3.19) for some user i, which we
denote {x(n)} and {y(n)} respectively. We have that {x(n)} and {y(n)} both approach the
same limit as n -- oo:
(2.3.20)
We will now complete the proof of (2.3.15). Since ri(n) > 0 for all n, it follows from (2.3.18)
and (2.3.19) that x(n) < q and y(n) < q for all n. By (2.3.20), it then follows that
u'i(rif("))f(y) < q-
If ri > 0, then there exists f such that ri(n) > 0 for all n > i. From (2.3.18) and (2.3.19),
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=q, rj (n) > 0,
2(n), y (n) - u(ri f (yfl f y). 
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it follows that x(n) = q and y(n) = q for all n > h. (2.3.20) then implies
u'(rif ())f (y) = q.
This proves (2.3.15).
Finally, we show (2.3.14). For this purpose, we first argue that rk = rNk, where rk(n) -rk
and rkr,(n) -- rrk; i.e., user k, not considered in (2.3.16), also transmits with the same rate as
the other users in his class at the Nash Equilibrium. For a contradiction, assume there exists
i C Ark such that ri < rk. Then, using (2.3.18), (2.3.19), and (2.3.20), we have
u(rif( ))f()f ) < UkJrkf())f(y).-
By Assumption 2, and since i and k have the same utility function, it follows that ri > rk, a
contradiction. A symmetric argument holds for ri > rk, so rk = rak.
Using this and (2.3.17), we have 1
W W
-EjJl rNJ EjE rj
This proves (2.3.14). [1
In the large system limit, users view 'y as constant when optimizing. This follows from
Equation (2.3.15), which is equivalent to the optimality condition of Equation (2.1.4) if -y is a
constant. The interpretation is that users are "SIR-takers;" they do not anticipate the effect
that their change in strategy will have on the SIR. This is analogous to [1] and [52] , in which
'For the proof of (2.3.14), we have assumed that the interference power 2 comes from ambient transmissions
occurring in frequencies within the original system's bandwidth of W. Therefore, this noise power does not
scale with n. If this assumption is dropped, and if thermal noise, which scales with a system's bandwidth, is
considered, (2.3.14) still holds as a very good approximation. Considering typical values, if the background noise
(from both ambient transmissions and thermal noise) has a density of 10- 17 W/Hz, W = 1.25x106 Hz, and
hkPma-x --- 0-]llwatts, then rk - 1.25. For J large,
E rj >> rkrlk
jeJ
and (2.3.14) follows. This is typical of CDMA systems in general; background noise is often neglected in analysis
due to CDMA:s "interference-limited" nature [50].
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users are "congestion-takers."
2.3.3 Defining the Wardrop Equilibrium
We now formally define the Wardrop Equilibrium, and prove its existence.
Definition 5. For a given price q, a Wardrop Equilibrium of the User Stage is a rate vector r
such that
rj argmax{uj(rjf(-y)) - rj V j, (2.3.21)
rj >0
where 'y is assumed to be constant in the optimization, and satisfies
W
E je rj
The results of the previous section show that the Wardrop Equilibrium is a good approxi-
mation of the Nash Equilibrium in a system with many users J and a large bandwidth W.
Proposition 5. There exists a Wardrop Equilibrium of the Rate Selection Game.
Proof: Define the function Bj(y) = argmaxrj>o{uj(rjf(y)) - qrj}; i.e., Bj(-y) is player j's
"best response" rate, given by (2.3.21), when the SIR is y. Note that by the strict concavity of
uj(.), Bj(y) is a continuous function that takes on the value of single real number for each y.
Showing the existence of a Wardrop Equilibrium is equivalent to showing the existence of an
SIR -y which satisfies the following equation:
W
EjEJ Bj (Y)
Since f() is one-to-one, this is equivalent to showing the existence of an SIR y which satisfies:
If WjE Bj ()- f ().
Since f(.) only takes on values in the compact, convex interval [0, 1], and f(.) is a continuous
convex valued function, it follows from Kakutani's fixed point theorem that there must exist an
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f(y), and therefore a y, which satisfies the preceding relation.
We now give the first order optimality conditions of (2.3.21).
uj(rjf(y))f(a) = q,
< q,
rj > 0,
rj = 0,
(2.3.22)
(2.3.23)
where
W
- (2.3.24)jEJ T3r
By the strict concavity of uj(-), the preceding conditions are necessary and sufficient. It will
often be more convenient to use the characterization (2.3.22 - 2.3.23) in future analysis.
2.3.4 Non-uniqueness of the Wardrop Equilibrium
In this section, we show by example that multiple Wardrop Equilibria may exist for a given
price q.
Example 1: Consider an instance of the Rate Selection Game with the following parameters:
uj(x) - u(x) = 500 - 500e-x, V j,
W
-= 9000,
q = 0.1488.
Also, let the efficiency function be any function satisfying Assumption 1 and
f(8) = 0.667, f(9) = 0.9. (2.3.25)
Since we have only placed restrictions on two points of the curve f(.), one can imagine that such
an efficiency function will exist. Constructing a closed form expression for such an efficiency
function, however, is difficult, and so instead we present a piecewise approximation of such an
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efficiency function.
Consider the following function, shown in Figure 2-4:
0, <0 y<6.07
f(y) = _ 16.776 + 2.764, 6.07 < y < 9
-0 + 1, 9< <c.
(2.3.26)
6.07 9
Figure 2-4: The function f(y) considered in Example 1.
Although f violates Assumptions 1.1, 1.4, and 1.5, one can construct a continuously differ-
entiable approximation of f such that (2.3.25) is satisfied, and this approximation will satisfy
Assumptions 1.1 and 1.4. By simulation, namely by plotting f(x/(1 + Cx)) for a range of values
C, we can convince ourselves that the approximation will also satisfy Assumption 1.5. Based on
the analysis of Proposition 4, it is clear that users with the same utility function will transmit
with the same rate at the Wardrop Equilibrium. Therefore, we let r cE I denote the common
transmission rate of all users, and (2.3.24) simplifies to
W
Jr'
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Let rl = 1000. We have the following:
( rif (7))f ( = e f (J ) e-2f(9)f(9) = q. (2.3.27)
Let r2 = 1125. We have the following:
u(2f (J))= f e 500 Jr2 ( = e-225f(8)f(8) q. (2.3.28)
(2.3.27) and (2.3.28) imply that rl and r2 are both Wardrop Equlibria. 
2.3.5 Properties of Wardrop Equilibria
For a given price q, the Wardrop Equilibrium may not be unique. In this section we will
study several properties of the Wardrop Equilibrium. In Chapter 4, we will use these properties
to show that under a profit maximizing price, the Wardrop Equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 6. Let and be two Wardrop Equilibria for a given price q with corresponding
channel qualities a and . Then a Z .
Proof: Consider two Wardrop Equilibria and , with corresponding SIR's y and . To
arrive at a contradiction, assume y = y = 7. Consider a user for whom rj < ri. From (2.3.22),
(2.3.23), and (2.3.23) , we have:
Uj(fjf(y))f(y) < uj(rj)f())f(),
which implies
u (r f(b)) < (^j f (2y ).
This, along with Assumption 2.2, gives
ijf(7y) > rjf(y),
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which implies
r. > r .
which yields a contradiction. A symmetric argument can be used to obtain a contradiction for
users with fj > rj. Therefore, fr = rj for all j, implying that the Wardrop Equilibria are not
distinct. L[
Proposition 7. Let and be two Wardrop Equilibria with corresponding SIR's i' and M. If
there exists a user i C J such that ri > 0 and ri > 0, then the following are equivalent.
1. '> '.
2. fjf(y) > rjf(), for all j e J.
Proof: To show that 1 implies 2, assume a > if. By Assumption 1.1, f(') > f(f). If j > r/j,
then rjf(§j) > rijf(y). If rj < rj, then
uj (r f(-j))f() _ < uj(j f( ) f( ).
Since f(5) > f(), this implies
uj(r)f(yj)) < Uj(Fijf( )),
which, by Assumption 2.2, implies
rf (') _ > rjf ()
To show 2 implies 1, assume rifty) > rif(f'). Since f and i are both Wardrop Equilibria,
u'i(fif())f(7) = ui(fif('))f(-).
Since u(.) is a strictly increasing function, this implies
f (a) > f (),
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and since f(.) is a strictly increasing function, we have
completing the proof. [
* 2.4 Efficiency through pricing
In this section, we solve for the optimal rate allocation with respect to two efficiency objec-
tives: maximizing the sum of the effective data rates, or throughput, of all users, and Pareto
efficiency. WVe show that the set of throughput maximizing rates is equivalent to the set of
Pareto efficient rates by showing that both efficiency objectives have the same necessary and
sufficient condition. We denote rate allocations which satisfy this condition as efficient. We
then show that an appropriately chosen price can result in a Wardrop Equilibrium with an
efficient rate allocation.
Definition 6. We say that a rate vector r* is a throughput maximizing rate allocation if it
maximizes the total effective data rate of the system.
r* E arg max Erf (2.4.1)
Definition 7. We say that a rate vector r* is a Pareto efficient rate allocation if there exists no
other rate vector r such that uj(rjf(-y)) > uj(r*f(-y*)), V j J and uj(rjf(y)) > uj(rjf(-y*))
for some j J.
Proposition 8. Consider a rate vector r with corresponding SIR -y. The following are equiva-
lent.
1. r is a throughput maximizing rate allocation.
2. r is a Pareto efficient rate allocation.
2.4. Efficiency through pricing 47
3. f y) =: -yf'(y)
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Proof: To show that 1 and 3 are equivalent, note that the objective in (2.4.1) is equivalent to
C argmax Rf 
g R>O R)}'
where R = Yje rj. From the analysis of Proposition 2, Step 1, we have that Rf(W) has a
unique global maximum R*. Also from the analysis of Proposition 2, Step 1, Rf(TW) has one
stationary point. This implies that the first order optimality condition
f(-*) = *f'(v*),
where y* = R, is both a necessary and sufficient optimality condition.
Figure 2-5: The functional form of the total effective data rate of the system as a function of
R.
We now show that 2 and 3 are equivalent. To show that 3 implies 2, let r be a rate vector
with corresponding SIR y, and assume f(y) = yf'(y). To find a contradiction, assume that r
is not Pareto efficient. Then, there exists a rate vector f such that uj(fjf(y)) > uj(rjf(-y)),
V j J and uj(fjf(iy)) > uj(rjf(y)) for some j J. Because uj is a strictly increasing
function, it must be that
Eff(y) > Erf(y).
This implies that f gives a higher total effective data rate. Since fy() = yf'(y), this contradicts
the equivalence of 1 and 3, which we have already proven.
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To show that 2 implies 3, let r be a Pareto efficient rate vector, with sum rate EjEJ r = R.
To find a contradiction, assume that f(y) yf'(y). Let Ec R+ be some scalar, and consider
the rate vector ar. The effective data rate of user j under ar is
krjf ( (2.4.2)
Taking the derivative of (2.4.2) with respect to a gives
ff( =rj if ( \ - f' (W fora =l, VjCJ.O-(a aRj kaRJ aR aRj
Therefore, there exists some a 7 1 such that arjf( ) > rjf(W), for all j. Since uj is a strictly
increasing function and r was assumed to be Pareto efficient, this is a contradiction. [1
Maximizing the total effective data rate of the system is a primary efficiency objective from
an engineering perspective, in that there is no outcome which can result in a higher utilization
of the system. Pareto efficiency is a primary efficiency objective from a social perspective, in
that one cannot find a redistribution of resources which benefits some user without hurting some
other user. This section has shown that the set of rates which maximize the total effective data
rate and the set of rates which are Pareto efficient are equivalent. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 8. Consider a rate vector r with corresponding SIR y. If f(y) = yf'(y), then we
say that r is efficient.
The condition f () = yf'(y) has been considered in several other works. In particular (and
not surprisingly), it was the optimality condition of [37] (see also [38]), which considered the
objective of choosing the optimal rate vector r to maximize the total effective data rate of
the system for a fixed power allocation p. It was also a necessary user optimality condition in
[45], in which users derived utility from their effective data rate and were charged a price 'yjrj.
Finally, it was a Nash Equilibrium condition in [34] and [43], in which users derive utility from
the energy efficiency of their mobile device.
The following Proposition shows that for an appropriately chosen price, the resulting Wardrop
Equilibrium can be an efficient rate allocation.
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Proposition 9. There exists a unique vector (q*, r*) such that r* is a Wardrop Equilibrium
under the price q* and r* is an efficient rate allocation.
Proof: By the definition of the Wardrop Equilibrium (Definition 2.3.3) and Proposition 8, it
is enough to show that there exists a unique solution (q, r) to the following system of equations:
u rj if( R)) (  ) q , r > 0, (2.4.3)
< q, rj = 0,
Zrj = R*. (2.4.4)
jEJ
where R* is the unique solution to f(w) = w f(W).
First, we will show the existence of a solution. By using the change of variables gj = rjf ( W)
and q = -- , this is equivalent to finding a solution (q, g) to the following system of equations:f(-)
u[j(gj) = q, rj > 0, (2.4.5)
< q, rj = 0,
gj = R*f() G*. (2.4.6)
jEUJ
Without loss of generality, rank the users according to decreasing u'j (0), so we have
u;(0) > 2(0) ... uJ(O).
Construct a solution in the following manner:
Set gi(l) = G*,q(l) = u(gl(1)) and gi(l) = 0 for i > 1. If u(0) u(gl(1)), then
(q(1),g(1)) is a solution to (2.4.5) and (2.4.6) and we are done. If uS(0) > u (gl(1)), compute
(gl(2),g2(2)) such that g1(2 ) + 92(2) = G*, and u (gl(2)) = u (g2(2)). To see that such a pair
(gl(2),92(2)) is guaranteed to exist, note that
u'(0) > u(G*),
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u2(0) > u1(G ),
and 92(2) = G* - (2).
Set q(2) = u(gi(2)) = (92(2)), and gi(2) = 0 for i > 2.
If u3(0) < u2(g2(2)), then (q(2),g(2)) is a solution to (2.4.5) and (2.4.6), and we are done.
If u3(0) > UL(g2(2)), compute (gl9(3),92(3),93(3)) such that gi9(3) + 92(3) + 93(3) = G*, and
u4 (gl (3)) = (g2(3)) = u3(g3 (3)). To see that such a (gl(3), g2(3), 93(3)) is guaranteed to exist,
note that
u (0) > u (G*)
U3(0) > U2(92 (2))
and 93(3) = G* - g91(3) - 92(3)
If we iterate in this fashion and no iteration j < J terminates with a solution to (2.4.5) and
(2.4.6), then at the end of the Jth iteration we will have Ej gj(J) = G* and q(J) = u (gl(J)) =
u... (gj(J)). In this case, (q(J),g(J)) is a solution to (2.4.5) and (2.4.6). Therefore, we are
guaranteed to find a solution.
To show uniquess, suppose, to arrive at a contradiction, that there is another price q with
an efficient Wardrop Equilibrium r. If q > q*, then from (2.4.3) it follows that j < r for all j
with rj* > 0. This implies Ej fj < j rj* = R*, contradicting (2.4.4). A symmetric argument
holds for q < q*. Therefore, q = q*, and in order to satisfy (2.4.3), it must be that rj = r. ]
The price q* can be interpreted as a Pigovian tax applied to offset the negative externality
that users impose on each other1 (see [30]).
Unfortunately, Example 1 (non-uniqueness) precludes the possibility that the Pigovian tax
is guaranteed to result in an efficient Wardrop Equilibrium; under the price q*, there may exist
another Wardrop Equilibrium r r* which is not efficient. In fact, an efficiency function
satisfying the conditions of Example 1 can be constructed such that rj = 1000 for all j is an
efficient rate allocation, giving us an example. This issue will be addressed in Chapter 4, where
'An externality occurs when a user's action indirectly impacts the utility of another user. In our model, when
a user increases his data rate, he reduces the SIR of the system and thus reduces the effective data rate of all
other users, creating a negative externality on them. The presence of negative externalities results in excessive
data transmission, and thus undesirably high interference levels. Named after economist Arthur Pigou, Pigovian
taxes are used to correct the resulting inefficiencies.
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it is shown that the efficient Wardrop Equilibrium under the Pigovian tax is unique for a broad
class of utility functions.
Example 1, part 2: Consider the instance of the Rate Selection Game described in Example
1. Figure 2-6 shows that rl = 1000 maximizes the system's throughput. From Example 1, we
know that rl = 1000 is a Wardrop Equilibrium under the price q = .1488, which along with the
uniqueness of the Pigovian tax implies that q must be the Pigovian tax. But by Example 1, the
Wardrop Equilibrium under q is not unique. 
1000
Figure 2-6: The value of r that maximizes the throughput is 1000.
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Chapter 3
Stability of the Wardrop Equilibrium and a rate
control algorithm
* 3.1 Convergence of a dynamic system to the Wardrop Equilibrium
Chapter 2 introduced the Wardrop Equilibrium, and shows that it has the appealing property
that each user only needs to know his own SIR -yj and the price q to determine whether his
current rate choice rj is optimal. It also shows that there is guaranteed to exist a Pigovian tax
q* for which there is an efficient Wardrop Equilibrium. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that the Wardrop Equilibrium notion may result in a price-based congestion control algorithm
which has limited information requirements and communication overhead for the end-users, and
results in an efficient rate allocation. In this chapter, we develop such an algorithm.
First, we describe a discrete time dynamic system in which each user chooses an optimal
rate in each time index according to the Wardrop Equilibrium definition. This system has one
or more fixed points, where each fixed point is a Wardrop Equilibrium. We characterize the
local stability properties of the fixed points.
Next, we consider the special case of an efficient equilibrium and show that the necessary
and sufficient local stability condition has a simple and easily interpretable form.
Finally, we motivate and describe a price-based rate control algorithm. In this algorithm,
the service provider changes the price over time in order to drive the system to efficiency. We
show that, even when the service provider has no knowledge of the users' utility functions,
the fixed point of the algorithm is an efficient Wardrop Equilibrium, and that this fixed point
satisfies desirable local stability properties.
Appendix A defines relevant terms and gives background results on local stability analysis.
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3.1.1 Local Stability of the dynamic system
We consider a discrete time system, where time is indexed by n. At each time n, each
user j J observes the system's SIR (n), and chooses a rate rj(n) to satisfy the Wardrop
Equilibrium equations (2.3.22) and (2.3.23); i.e., they choose the rate that maximizes their
payoff (2.1.3), viewing y as a constant parameter. The rates rj(n) therefore satisfy
uj(rj(n)f(y(n)))f ((n)) = q, rj(n) > 0, (3.1.1)
< q, rj(n) = O.
The SIR is then updated by
W
y(n + 1) = (3.1.2)Cj rj ()
An equilibrium r of this system, with corresponding SIR y, is a Wardrop Equilibrium of the
Rate Selection Game under the price q. We can equivalently express the SIR update of this
system in a simpler form as follows. For notational clarity, let x(n) denote the value of the
efficiency function f(.) at time n, i.e. x(n) = f(-y(n)). We have the following SIR update
equation, which can be obtained by substituting (3.1.1) into (3.1.2):
x(n + 1) = f ( Wx(n) ) (3.1.3)
\jEJact j (n)
where Jct = {jIrj(n) > 0}.
We note that u'-l(x) is not defined for x > u (). Consistent with the Wardrop Equilibrium
notion (3.1.1) that user j chooses rj = 0 if ) > u(0), we define
uj 1 (x) = O, > Uj(O) (3.1.4)
With this definition, we can write (3.1.3) as
( )wT~E j (n))
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Let x denote the equilibrium of (3.1.5):
= j (a -WX q )(3.1.6)
Let y(q) denote the Wardrop Equilibrium SIR under the price q; i.e., x = f('-(q)). Let S(q)
denote the partial derivative of the RHS of (3.1.6), for the price q, with respect to x evaluated
at the equilibrium x = f (y(q)):
S(q) - T {f ,~ 1; (x) (3.1.7)
Due to (3.1.4), the function u- 1 (x) is not smooth at x = uj(O), and therefore thhe partial
derivative in (3.1.7) may not exist for all x; i.e., it may have differing left and right derivatives.
To see why this non-differentiability occurs, consider a user j and a time n and suppose that
uj(O)x(n) =: q. For any SIR satisfying f(-y(n)) > x(n), the user will transmit with positive
rate r(n) > (cf. (3.1.1)). For any SIR satisfying f(-y(n)) < x(n), the user will transmit
with rate rj = 0 (cf. (3.1.1)). Therefore, a marginal increase in x(n) results in a marginal
increase in rj(n), whereas a marginal decrease in x(n) results in no marginal change in rj(n).
For an example, see Figure (3-1) and note the differing left and right derivative at f (Y). Here,
maxj u'(0) = I . For f(/y) < f (/cy), all users choose a rate of rj (n+ 1) = 0, so f(y(n + ))= 1.
For any f (y) > f (7), at least one user is active with strictly positive rate.
If such a situation arises at the equilibrium x = f(y(q)), then the partial derivative in
(3.1.7) may not exist. Therefore, we let S+(q) and S-(q) denote the right and left derivative,
respectively, in (3.1.7). For the case S-(q) $7 S+(q), we define
S(4q)-= max (IS(q)l, S+(q)}
S+(q),S- (q)
We present the following local stability result.
Proposition 10. Consider the system (3.2.6) under the price q. This system is locally stable
if and only if IS(q)l < 1.
Proof: Let x denote the equilibrium of this one-dimensional system. We linearize the system
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with x(n) = x + e(n), where e(n) denotes the local perturbation from the equilibrium. If
S+ (q) = S-(q), the linearization of this one-dimensional system is given by
e(n + 1) = S(q)e(n). (3.1.8)
Since S(q) is a scalar, the only eigenvalue of S(q) is simply S(q), so this system is locally stable
if and only if S(q*) < 1.
Now, suppose S+(q) S-(q). Assume IS+(q) > S-(q)l; the argument for IS+(q)l <
IS - (q)l is symmetric. If e(n) > 0, then we have the linearization
e(n + 1) = S+(q)e(n).
The system is locally stable if and only if IS+(q)l = IS(q)l < 1.
If e(n) < 0, then we have the linearization
e(n + 1) = S-(q)e(n).
If IS(q)l < 1, we have IS-(q)l < IS+(q)l < 1, so the system is locally stable. Therefore, the
system is locally stable for arbitrary e(n) if and only if IS(q)l < 1. 0
We can visualize the Wardrop Equilibrium SIR -y(q) by plotting the right hand side of (3.2.6)
as a function of x(n). The intersection of this curve with the line of slope 1 passing through the
origin represents the equilibrium SIR, i.e., the SIR for which x(n + 1) = x(n). This is shown in
Figure 3-1. S(q) can be interpreted as the slope of the curve shown in Figure 3-1 at its point
of intersection with the line of slope 1.
3.1.2 Local Stability of efficient equilibria
In Section 2.4, we presented necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be efficient.
Furthermore, in Section 2.4, we proved the existence of a price, interpreted as a Pigovian tax,
which induced an efficient equilibrium. Finally, in Section 3.1.1 we gave necessary and sufficient
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f(Yc) f(y(q))
Figure 3-1: x(n+ 1) as a function of x(n) for a fixed price q. The equilibrium SIR y(q) is shown.
Note that at y,, we have maxj uj'(0) = ' . For 'y < c, all users choose a rate of rj(n + 1) = 0,
so f(''(n + 1))= 1.
conditions for a Wardrop Equilibrium to be locally stable. A natural question is: When are
efficient equilibria locally stable? We answer this question next. We present the result in terms
of the users' absolute risk aversion Aj(x), which is defined and interpreted in Section 1.4.3.
Proposition 11. Consider the system (3.2.6), and assume q = q* where q* denotes the Pigovian
tax of Section 2.4. Let r* be an efficient Wardrop Equilibrium with corresponding SIR -y* under
price q*. Let gj* = rjf(y*) denote user j's throughput, and let G* = argmaxR Rf ( ) denote
the system's maximum throughput. Let act = {jlq* = u(g*)f(y*)} denote the set of active
users at the Wardrop Equilibrium. Then, this equilibrium is locally stable if and only if
Z 1
A,(g 2*.jEJact
(3.1.9)
Proof: We solve for S(q*), and note that at an efficient equilibrium, we have f(y*) = y*f'(y*).
-
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Furthermore, note that Ej u'- l ( q* ) =E rj*f (-y*) = G*. Next, we use
.1q jffact,
I-1 (X = 9j,
along with the necessary and sufficient condition of Proposition 10 to arrive at
f(Q*) EU () <2G*. (3.1.10)
Then, we use the first order condition q = u(rjf(y))f(y) for all j G .,act, along with the
definition of absolute risk aversion to complete the proof. O
Example: Consider a system with the modulation scheme of non-coherent FSK, no error
coding, 50 bits per frame, and W = 4.096 x 106:
f() =(1- e-2)50° .
We can calculate the maximum throughput as
G* = 347.17, kbps.
Assume all users have the same utility function, given by
uj() = 1 - e- bx V j.
In this case, we can compute the absolute risk aversion for each user as
Aj(x) = b, V j.
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Therefore, the efficient equilibrium is locally stable if and only if
J
- < 694340.
b
As more users join the system and J increases, it will eventually become necessary to increase
G*, the system's capacity, by, for example, increasing W in order to maintain local stability at
the efficient equilibrium. 
* 3.2 Dynamic pricing
3.2.1 Motivation
In the stability analysis thus far, we have assumed that there exists some price q which is
static over time. However, it seems reasonable that if the base station was able to dynamically
change the price at each time n, then it could improve the local stability of the system. This
section will motivate this idea. We first have the following assumption which will hold for the
remainder of this chapter.
Assumption 4: Assume that the Wardrop Equilibrium under any price q is unique.
We now present a sufficient condition under which Assumption 4 holds. The condition is
expressed in terms of the users' relative risk aversion, Rj(x), which is defined and interpreted
in Section 1.4.3.
Proposition 12. If Rj(x) < 1 for all x and for all j, then Assumption 4 holds.
Proof: Since Rj(x) < 1, (1.4.1) implies
u'j(x)x + uj(x) > 0, V j,V x.
We therefore have
a{f()} {u'j(r-jf())f(y)} = I uO'(rjf(y))rjf(y) + uj(rjf(-y)) > 0, V j, V rj.
Therefore, u'(rjf(-y))f(-y) is strictly increasing in f(y). Let j(n) denote user j's rate choice
3.2. Dynamic pricing 59
3.2. Dynamic pricing
after observing SIR '(n), and r(n) denote user j's rate choice after observing SIR y(n), where
'(n) < y(n). We claim that j(n) < rj(n). Too see this, note that since f(-y) is a strictly
increasing function of y, we have for all j C Jact
u'j(rj(n) f (y(n)))f ((n)) = q (3.2.1)
u'(rj (n)(y'(n)))f(7(n)) (3.2.2)
> Uj (rj (n)f((n)))f(y(n)) (3.2.3)
By the strict concavity of uj (cf. Assumption 2.2), j(n) < rj(n) for all j. Therefore,
f((n + 1)) > f ((n + 1)). (3.2.4)
We will now complete the proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that there are two fixed points
x and i of (3.1.5), where each fixed point satisfies (3.1.6). Assume, without loss of generality,
that x(n) < x(n). Recall that we are using the notation f('y(n)) = x(n), and so we have
f(y(n)) < f (y(n)). Since x(n) = x(n + 1) and x(n) = (n + 1), we have
x(n)- x(n) = x(n + 1)- x(n + 1).
But x(n) - 5(n) > 0, and by (3.2.4) we have x(n + 1) - x(n + 1) < 0, a contradiction. This
implies that there can only be one fixed point x satisfying x(n + 1) = x(n). Since the set of
fixed points of the dynamic system are equivalent to the set of Wardrop Equilibria, the Wardrop
Equilibrium must be unique. [
The condition Rj (x) < 1 for all j and for all x will appear in a central result in Chapter 4
as well.
Consider the following system: At each time n, each user j C J observes the system's SIR
-y(n) and price q(n), and chooses a rate rj(n) to satisfy the Wardrop Equilibrium equations
(2.3.22) and (2.3.23) (i.e., they choose the rate that maximizes their payoff (2.1.3), viewing y
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as a constant parameter):
u'j(r(n)f(-y(n)))f(y(n)) = q(n), rj(n) > 0, (3.2.5)
< q(n), rj(n) = 0.
The SIR is then updated by
W
y(n + 1) = (3.2.6)
Finally, the price is updated as a function of r(n)
q(n + 1) = s(r(n)), (3.2.7)
where s : R J - R+ is a price update rule chosen by the service provider. We now state the
service provider's objective.
Service provider objective: Let q* denote the Pigovian tax, under which the rate allocation
r* is an efficient Wardrop Equilibrium with corresponding SIR y*. The service provider's
objective is to choose the mapping s such that (q*, r*) is a locally stable equilibrium of the
system (3.2.5 - 3.2.7).
We can equivalently express the SIR update of this system in a simpler form as follows. For
notational clarity, let x(n) denote the value of the efficiency function f(.) at time n, i.e. x(n) =
f(y(n)). We have the following SIR update equation, which can be obtained by substituting
(3.2.5) into (3.2.6):
x(n + 1)f ( Wx(n) ) (3.2.8)
If the service provider knows the utility function of all users, and the value of the efficient SIR
-y*, then the service provider can satisfy its objective by choosing q(n) to satisfy the following
equation:
Wx(n)
,1 (i*) (3.2.9)
If the service provider is able to solve the nonlinear equation (3.2.9) for the single unknown q(n),
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the system is guaranteed to be locally stable at r* under this price choice. For any perturbation
from this equilibrium, the system will immediately return to the equilibrium.
However, the price update (3.2.9) requires knowledge of the utility functions uj; a more
realistic assumption is that the service provider must update the price with no knowledge of
the utility functions. Furthermore, even with knowledge of the utility functions, (3.2.9) may
be difficult to solve. In the next section, we propose a pricing scheme with simple computation
which requires no knowledge of the utility functions.
3.2.2 A dynamic pricing scheme to achieve efficiency
We make the following assumption on the service provider's information structure.
Assumption 6: Assume that the service provider does not know the utility functions uj.
Furthermore, assume that the service provider knows the efficiency function f(-), and can
compute the efficient SIR y* satisfying f(y*) = y*f'(y*).
The system under consideration is
X(n + 1) =f - () (3.2.10)
q(n + 1) (r(n (3.2.11)
where s(-) is a price update rule chosen by the service provider. As before, let y* denote
the efficient SIR satisfying f(y*) = y*f'('y*), and let q* be such that (q*,r*) is a Wardrop
Equilibrium with SIR y*. Finally, let y(q) denote the Wardrop Equilibrium SIR under a general
price q. We have the following.
Proposition 13. Let -y(q) be the equilibrium SIR under the price q. -y(q) is a nondecreasing
function of q.
Proof: For a contradiction, assume that there exists a price q > q with Wardrop Equilibrium
SIR 'y(q) such that y(4) < y(q). Since f(0) = 1, the RHS of (3.2.10) is 1 for x(n) = 0.
Furthermore, since we have assumed that there is a unique Wardrop Equilibrium under q, it
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follows that
fhwxi> (n ) ) for x(n) < f ((q)).
Since f () is a strictly increasing function and I 1 is a strictly decreasing function, we have
.7
f ( n >Wx ( n)it Cj 'U 4 ) for x(n) < f (y(q)).
E K Wff((c)) 
uJ I ( 4 )
> f(-Y(q)),
which contradicts y(q) being an equilibrium SIR.
We have the following Corollary which follows from the analysis of Proposition 13.
Corollary 1. Let q* denote the Pigovian tax. Let S(q) be defined as in (3.1.7). We have
S(q*) < 0.
Proof: Let x* denote the equilibrium of (3.2.12), and let y* denote the corresponding SIR.
As shown in. Proposition 13,
for x(n) < x*.
Wf x(n) > (n)
Since x* is an equilibrium,
Wx = X*.Since, by assumption, x is the nique eq ilibrium, it follows that the slope of
Since, by assumption, x* is the unique equilibrium, it follows that the slope of
f (Wx(n)/Zj u- (_)) at x(n) = x*, which is equivalent to S(q*), must be negative. O
We consider the following price update for (3.2.11). The SIR update is shown for conve-
nience:
x(n + 1) = f Wx(n) )
-- 1 q(n) 'Ej % x(n)
q(n + 1) = q(n) + a(f (*) - f ((n))).
Therefore,
(3.2.12)
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where a is some constant positive stepsize. This price update scheme is motivated by Proposition
13. Based on the nondecreasing property of y(q), we consider an algorithm in which, at time
n, the service provider observes the SIR y(n). If y(n) < *, the service provider will increase
the price. If y(n) > *, the service provider will decrease the price.
Before studying the local stability properties of (3.2.12 - 3.2.13), we observe that such a
price update has a natural economic interpretation known as price ttonnement (see [33]). If,
at some time n, y(n) < *, then the sum rate of all users r satisfies Ej rj(n) > -j r*. We
can interpret this as an "excess demand" for rate; the users are transmitting with such high
data rates that it is hurting the system's overall throughput. When this excess demand is
present, the service provider increases the price according to (3.2.13). Similarly, we can view
the case where >j rj(n) < j r* as "excess supply;" the system can support higher data rates
and improve total throughput. In this case, the service provider reduces the price. This kind
of dynamic price adjustment as a response to excess supply or demand is commonly referred
to as price ttonnement in the economics literature. In the context of (3.2.13), the quantity
f(i*) - f(y(n)) is used as a simple and easily computable measure of the excess supply or
demand.
We now study the local stability properties of this algorithm, and present conditions on the
stepsize values that will establish local stability. Recall that the system with static pricing is
locally stable if and only if IS(q*)l < 1. We will show that the system (3.2.12), (3.2.13) will be
locally stable for a larger range of values of S(q*). We linearize the system (3.2.12), (3.2.13)
around its equilibrium point (x*, q*), where x* = f(-y*). The Jacobian is given by
J i S(q*) -L
where
L l (3.2.14)Ej u .,'
This value of L is found by solving for the appropriate partial derivative, and then simplifying
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by substituting the efficiency condition f(y*) = y*f'(y*). Consistent with (3.1.4), we define
Us j) ( ) = 0, x > U (0).
The eigenvalues of J are given by:
S(q*) + 1 + (S(q*) + 1)2 - 4(S(q*) - La) (3.2.15)
2 2 2
2 (q*) 1 (S(q*) + 1)2 + 4(S(q*) - La) (3.2.16)
2 2 2
Define A as
A = argmax {(A1, A2 1}.
The system is locally stable if and only if AI[ < 1. Note that for -1 < S(q*) < O, we can choose
the stepsize
S(q*)f= L
and we will have AI < 1. This is not surprising; if the system with static pricing is locally stable,
we can find a stepsize such that the system with dynamic pricing is locally stable. Because of
this, and since we have shown S(q*) < 0, we will focus on the case in which S(q*) < -1. In
this case, we have A = A1:
A S(q*) 1 (S(q*) + 1)2 - 4(S(q*) - La) (3.2.17)
> 2 + 2 2 (3.2.17)-- 
We have the following two Propositions, which show the improvement in local stability as a
result of dynamic pricing.
Proposition 14. Consider the system the system (3.2.12). For a = (3.2.13) is locally
stable if and only if IS(q*)l < 1.5.
Proof: Figure 3-2 shows a plot of A as a function of S(q*) for ILal = 1. As shown, AI < 1 is
equivalent to IS(q*)l < 1.5. 0
Proposition 14 shows the improved local stability that results from dynamic pricing; recall
that the system under the static price q* is locally stable if and only if S(q*)l < 1. Therefore,
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Figure 3-2: A as a function of S(q*) for a stepsize a = -.
for -1.5 < S(q*) < -1, dynamic pricing with the stepsize specified in Proposition 14 stabilizes
an otherwise unstable system.
Proposition 15. There exists a such that the system (3.2.12), (3.2.13) is locally stable if and
only if IS(q*)l < 3.
Proof: For IS(q*)l > 3, we have S(q*) + < -1. This implies R{A} < -1, and therefore
AI > 1.
For IS(q*)l < 3, choose a = 4S(q*)-(S(q*)+1) and XAI < 1. O4L
Proposition 15 shows that dynamic pricing can stabilize an otherwise unstable system for
-3 < S(q*) < 1. However, this proposition is weaker than Proposition 14 in the sense that
the stepsize of Proposition 14 is guaranteed to stabilize the system for any IS(q*)l < 1.5,
whereas a stepsize that stabilizes the system for S(q*)l = 2 may not stabilize it for arbitrary
S(q*) (-3,0)
The stepsizes, and the extent to which the local stability properties improve, are given in
terms of the quantities L and S(q*). We now present a result that relates L and S(q*) to system
parameters.
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Proposition 16. Let (q*, r*) be the efficient Wardrop Equilibrium of the Rate Selection Game,
and let y* be the associated Wardrop Equilibrium SIR. Let gj - rj*f(y*) denote the equilibrium
throughput of user j, and let G* denote the total system throughput. Let act = {jlrj > 0}
denote the set of active users at the Wardrop Equilibrium. We have
C 1
Ejffact 2~l(g*)L jact = (g;) (3.2.18)
S = IG (3.2.19)G*
Proof: These can be derived by taking appropriate partial derivatives, and making use of the
following:
Because the equilibrium is efficient, we have
f(a*) = 7'f'('*)
By the definition of the Wardrop Equilibrium, we have
q = uj (gj*)f ( ).
This can be rewritten as
U.-1 · L' =9
We also have
q*1
Substituting these into 3.2.14 ives the expression for L. Substituting these into 3.1.7 after
Substituting these into 3.2.14 gives the expression for L. Substituting these into 3.1.7 after
taking the partial derivative gives the expression for S. El
Propositions 14 and 15 show that the appropriate stepsize is inversely proportional to ILI.
By Proposition 16, we see that, in general, the required stepsize is increasing in the second
derivative of the users' utility functions. Furthermore, ISI is decreasing in the absolute risk
aversion of the users, so we expect improved local stability properties of the system with higher
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absolute risk aversions of the users.
The analysis presented in this section focuses on local, rather than global, stability analysis.
A system is globally stable if it converges to the equilibrium from any initialization. Under-
standing the global stability properties of the static and dynamic pricing schemes presented in
this chapter is left as a future direction. However, local stability analysis is the first step to
validating the convergence properties of an algorithm. The numerical simulation in the next
section shows that the dynamic pricing scheme proposed in this chapter has promise in terms
of its global stability properties.
3.2.3 Numerical simulation
In this subsection, we illustrate how dynamic pricing can stabilize an otherwise unstable
system. We assume all users have the same utility function, given by
uj() = 1 - e- x V j.
We use an efficiency function
f() = (1 - e-) 5,
and w = 2.3. We want the system to be stable at a Wardrop Equilibrium r* under the price
q* = 0.3. We initialize the system with f(y(O)) = 0.1. With static pricing, where q(n) - q* = .3
for all n, the system is unstable and oscillates. With dynamic pricing, we initialize q(O) = .4,
choose a stepsize of a = .05, and the system converges to the equilibrium (q*, r*).
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Figure 3-3: An instance of the dynamic system presented in this chapter under both static (top)
and dynamic (bottom) pricing
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Chapter 4
Profit-maximizing pricing
In Part 1, we showed that an appropriately chosen price, interpreted as a Pigovian tax, can lead
to an efficient rate allocation. However, the use of such a Pigovian tax to promote efficiency
assumes that the agent setting prices is interested in maximizing the system's efficiency. Another
realistic assumption is that the prices are set by a service provider, who is a selfish agent that
acts strategically by setting the price in order to maximize profit. This motivates us to ask the
following fundamental question: If prices are set by a profit maximizing agent, whom we refer
to as the Service Provider, what is the resulting efficiency loss?
The purpose of this chapter is to answer this question. We show that despite the selfish
behavior of all agents involved, for a broad class of user utility functions there is no efficiency
loss; i.e. the profit maximizing price is equal to the Pigovian tax of Chapter 2.
Furthermore, we show that the Wardrop Equilibrium is always unique under a profit max-
imizing price, implying that this price will not result in an inefficient Wardrop Equilibrium as
opposed to the efficient Wardrop Equilibrium.
We model this situation by adding a Service Provider stage to the Rate Selection Game
considered in Chapter 2.
Definition 9. The Price-Rate Control Game has J+1 players, consisting of the set of users j
and the Service Provider, who act sequentially according to the following utilities and strategy
spaces.
1. Service provider stage: The service provider chooses a price q to maximize its total profit,
given that each user will choose a rate to maximize his payoff.
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max q rj (4.0.1)q>O0
s.t. rj argmax{uj (rjf(y(r))) - qrj}, V j.
rj 0
2. User stage
3. Power Control stage
where the User stage and Power Control stage are given in Definition 3
Characterizing the optimal price from the service provider's viewpoint corresponds to finding
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of this sequential game (see [40]). Every price q defines
a different subgame, and this subgame corresponds to the game that was studied in Chapter 2.
Thus, for every price q, there is an associated Wardrop Equilibrium r(q). The set of r(q) for all
possible prices q corresponds to an equilibrium path, and the service provider's objective is to
choose a price q on this equilibrium path such that r(q) satisfies the objective 4.0.1.
* 4.1 Efficiency through profit maximizing prices
In this section, we study the Service Provider stage of the Price-Rate Control Game. We
show that despite the non-uniqueness of the Wardrop Equilibrium that was shown in Chapter
2, the Wardrop Equilibrium under profit maximizing pricing is unique. We then isolate a broad
class of utility functions that guarantee the subgame perfect equilibrium will be efficient. We
conclude the chapter with examples.
To find the subgame perfect equilibrium, we substitute the Wardrop Equilibrium conditions
(2.3.22) and (2.3.23) into the Service Provider Objective (4.0.1):
4.1. Efficiency through profit maximizing prices
max q rj
r,q
s.t. u(rjf ())f () = q,
< q,
Equivalently, (4.1.1) can be written as:
max Z u'j(rjf (7))f(Y)rj
r,q
s.t. u (rj f )) f (y) = q,
< q,
Definition 10. The Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE)
the optimal solutions to (4.1.2).
of the Price-Rate Control Game are
We have shown in Example 1 that for a price q, the Wardrop Equilibrium may not be
unique. However, the following Proposition shows that the service provider can always find a
profit maximizing price for which the Wardrop Equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 17. (Uniqueness) There exists a profit maximizing price for which the Wardrop
Equilibrium is unique.
Proof: Figure 4-1 plots Rf(W) (the system throughput)
value of R which maximizes the system throughput. We
arguments. We first prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 17.1: There is guaranteed to exist an SPE (, i)
Proof: Consider any Wardrop Equilibrium given a price q.
let R = E jj, and let = W. Assume that
as a function of R. R* denotes the
will use this figure in the following
with 0 < R < R*, where R = E i.
Let T be the equilibrium rate vector,
R* < R < oo.
We will show that there is guaranteed to exist another Wardrop Equilibrium under a different
rj > 0,
rj = 0,
(4.1.1)
j.
rj > 0,
rj = 0,
(4.1.2)
j.
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Rf(')
B R* R R = Erj
Figure 4-1: The total effective data rate of the system as a function of R. Lemma 17.1 of
the proof shows that for any Wardrop Equilibrium with R > R*, there is another Wardrop
Equilibrium under a different price with equal profit for the service provider such that R < R*.
price q with the same profit, whose rates r satisfy 0 < R < R*.
Because Rf(W) is strictly increasing from 0 to its maximum value for 0 < R < R*, and
strictly decreasing for R* < R < oo (cf. proof of Proposition 2, Step 1) (see Figure 4-1), there
exists a unique R < R such that
W W
R R
Furthermore, it must be that 0 < R < R*. Let y = -W. Define K as
f()
K= f(-) (4.1.3)
Define rj, for all j, as
j.
Note that W/z rj = y. We have
rjf(y) = Vjf(4),
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Because T is a Wardrop Equilibrium, we have
uj(TJf(7))f(~7) = , rj > 0, (4.1.5)
< , rj = 0.
(4.1.3), (4.1.4), and (4.1.5) imply
u'(rjf(y))f(y) = Kq, rj > 0,
< Kq, rj = 0,
(4.1.6)
Therefore, for a price q = Kq, r is a Wardrop Equilibrium. Furthermore, (4.1.4) implies
E {u(rf (7))f(77)Tj } = E _rjf(-y))f(-y) j
i j
Therefore, the service provider profits under (q, r) and (, Y) are equal. Because we can find
some Wardrop Equilibrium with R (0, R*) to match the profit of any Wardrop Equilibrium
outside this range, there must exist a profit maximizing Wardrop Equilibrium /R such that
O < R < R*. This implies there exists an SPE (, ) such that 0 < R < R*. O
The next lemma shows that any two SPE's under the same price will both have the same
sum data rate.
Lemma 17.2: Let (, ) be an SPE such that 0 < R < R*. Then for any other Wardrop
Equilibrium under , we have = ft.
Proof: If R> R, then
q f r >q rj,
which is a contradiction, since is a profit maximizing equilibrium. If R < I, then
W W
>-- = ~. (4.1.7)fR
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For 0 < R < R*, R f(W) is increasing. Therefore,
W WRif( ) < f( ),
which implies
fjff(I) < jf (), for some j. (4.1.8)
(4.1.7) and (4.1.8) contradict Proposition 7. Therefore, -= R. f
We now return to the proof of the Proposition. Let q be the price such that (q, i) is an SPE,
and 0 < R < R*; such a price is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 17.1. Assume there is another
Wardrop Equilibrium . From Lemma 17.2, R = R, so i = ~. This contradicts Proposition
6. D
There may be an SPE (q, f) such that ft > R*. However, due to the non-uniqueness of the
Wardrop Equilibria, the service provider has no guarantee that the Wardrop Equilibrium r will
be the result when the price is set to q. There may be another non profit maximizing Wardrop
Equilibrium r f' for the price .
Proposition 17 shows that it is in the service provider's best interest to restrict the feasible
region of the Service Provider objective (4.1.1) to the region 0 < R < R*; in doing so, the service
provider ensures the uniqueness of the Wardrop Equilibrium under the profit maximizing price.
Therefore, for the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to the following region:
{rIO < R < R*}, (4.1.9)
where
ft* =argmax f ( )}
R R ) 
We next present conditions which ensure that the SPE of the Price-Rate Control Game
results in an efficient rate allocation. For this purpose, we first prove the following two lemmas.
The first lemma shows that the Service Provider Objective (4.1.1) is equivalent to a simpler
problem, in which we only consider users who transmit with strictly positive rate at the SPE.
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Lemma 18.1: Let (, r) be an SPE. Define the set
JSPE = {jrj > 0}.
Let [j]jEJspE C IIJ7sPEI denote the vector consisting of components of the rate vector E R J
corresponding to users in the set JSPE. Then, (, [j]jeJpE) is an optimal solution to
max q rj
q'[r]bJESPE jESPE
s.t. u'j(rjf (-))f (y) = q, V j E JSPE
q > 0, rj > O, V j E JsPE,
where
W
jeJSPE rj'
Proof: To arrive at a contradiction, suppose there exists (q, []jeJspE) such that
q JPE j> SPE jjESpE jEgSPE
(4.1.10)
Let
W
ZjE7SPE r
R= Y: j.
jeJSPE
Also, let y(q), [rj(q)]jEJ, and R(q) denote the Wardrop Equilibrium SIR, rate vector, and sum
rate under the price q. We claim that
R(q) > R.
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To arrive at, a contradiction, suppose R(q) < R. This implies that y(q) > 'y. We then have
u}(rj(cj)f (Y(c)))f (Y) < Ul(rj(c)f (()))f ((Q))
< q
= u'(fj f (y))f (), V j SPE.
By the strict concavity of uj, this implies
rj( q)f(y(q)) > jf('), V j C JSPE-
Because frj -= 0 for j 1 JSPE, we have
rj(q)f (y(q)) > -jf(y), V j C J7. (4.1.12)
Summing (4.1.12) over all j C J, we obtain
R(q)f (RW(f > Rf -R- (4.1.13)
We are restricted to the region 0 < R < R* by (4.1.9), which implies Rf((W) is a strictly
increasing function of R (cf. proof of Proposition 8). We then have R(q) > R, which is a
contradiction. From (4.1.10) and (4.1.11), we have
q , r(7q)> > S >j = c j (4.1.14)
iEJ jEJsPE jeJSPE iEJ
which is a contradiction, since (q, ) is an SPE, which must be profit maximizing [
Hence, when considering the Service Provider objectives (4.1.1) and (4.1.2), we can restrict
attention to the set of users transmitting with strictly positive data rate. The next lemma
expresses the Service Provider objective in a form which will allow us to more easily see when
the efficiency condition of Section 2.4 will be met.
Lemma 18.2 Let (r, i) be an SPE, with sum rate f = jE rJ, and SIR - = !. Then, (k,),f? = EiEJ R
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where ki= f-- and j = rjf(), is an optimal solution to
max Z uj(gj9gj
jE.7SPE
s.t. uj(gj) = k, Vj E JSPE,
j E i {max Rf ( )}jEJsVp j R
gj > O, V j E e SPE.
Proof: To arrive at a contradiction, suppose there exists 9 and k such that
Uj(sj)p >jEPE
: gsPE
jEJsPE
] uj(j)
jEJSPE
V i C JSPE,
<max {Rf
(4.1.15)
(4.1.16)
(4.1.17)
(4.1.18)
(4.1.19)
(4.1.20)(W)}
We construct a vector T such that
Th -
RR
V j C JSPE, (4.1.21)
where R = Ej Tj. Such an T is guaranteed to exist due to (4.1.20). We have
J = SE Ujjf
jEJSPE
(W)) Tf (W)R R
(4.1.23)= 5 u[j(9)9j
jEJSpE
> 5 uj(%)fjeJSPE
jEJSPE
jE:SPE
(4.1.24)
(4.1.22) and (4.1.23) follow from (4.1.19) and (4.1.21). (4.1.24) follows from the SPE feasibility
fQR) jEJSPE
(4.1.22)
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constraint in (6.1). Therefore, (kf(W), r) contradicts (, i) being an SPE. E[
Writing the Service Provider objective as (4.1.15)-(4.1.18) has two benefits. First, it elim-
inates the mathematical complexity of dealing with the efficiency function by expressing user
j's utility in terms of a single variable gj. The effect of the efficiency function is captured by
the single real number maxR {Rf( w)} in (4.1.17); this number represents the maximum total
effective data rate the system can support. Second, isolating conditions for which the SPE
is throughput maximizing and Pareto optimal becomes equivalent to isolating conditions for
which the constraint (4.1.17) is tight. This will simplify our future analysis.
The interpretation of the service provider problem, when written in the form of (4.1.15)-
(4.1.18), is as follows: the vector g represents the vector of effective data rates. The service
provider chooses any price (and implicitly a corresponding allocation of effective data rates),
subject to 2 constraints: (4.1.16) says that the user optimality conditions must be satisfied, and
(4.1.17) says that the service provider cannot allocate more throughput than the system can
support.
We next present a class of utility functions which guarantee that the subgame perfect equi-
libriurn is efficient, as defined in Section 2.4. These utility functions are characterized by their
relative risk aversions Rj(x), which was defined and interpreted in Section 1.4.3.
Proposition 18. Consider the Price-Rate Control Game. If Rj(x) < 1, V j, V x, then the
subgame perfect equilibrium is efficient.
Proof: From Lemmas 18.1 and 18.2, the Service Provider Objective can be written as:
max E ulj(gj)gj (4.1.25)
k'[g]iJefSPE igSPE
<j Es i max {Rf( ~)} (4.1.27)
sP (4.1.28)
gj 0, V j JSPE. (4.1.28)
The constraint gradients are linearly independent (see Appendix C), so the problem admits
Lagrange multipliers. Therefore, we can assign Lagrange multipliers A1, ..., Aj to the first group
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of constraints (4.1.26) and a Lagrange multiplier u < 0 to the remaining constraint (4.1.27) to
arrive at the following Lagrangian function:
L(k,g,A, p) = u(gj)gj + E Aj(u[(g j)-k)+p ( E gj -max{Rf W r)}
jEJSPE jEJSPE jEJspE
By taking derivatives with respect to gj and k respectively, and using the first order optimality
conditions, we obtain the following:
u(gj)gj + u'(gj) + Au(gj) + u = 0, V j C SPE, (4.1.29)
- Z Aj = O. (4.1.30)
jEJSPE
We claim that p # 0 in (4.1.29). To arrive at a contradiction, assume that = 0. Summing
(4.1.29) over j and using (4.1.30), we have
E~ { ut(gj) + ult(g)g } = 0.u'(gj)
If Rj(x) < 1, for all j and for all x, then
u'j(x) + xu'(x) > , V j, V x,
which implies
E { uj(gj) }+ u (gj)gj3·i U j < 0,
yielding a contradiction. This implies that p y 0, and by the complementary slackness condition,
constraint (4.1.27) holds with equality; see [44]. Therefore, the SPE is throughput maximizing,
and by Proposition 8 it is efficient. O
One can view p as the marginal cost of the constraint (4.1.27) from the service provider's
viewpoint (i.e., if the service provider were able to increase the system's capacity by a marginal
amount 6, the resulting profits would increase by up). When the relative risk aversion condition
of Proposition 18 holds, this marginal cost is guaranteed to be positive, so the limiting factor
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for the service provider's profits will always be the maximum throughput of the system; see
Figure 4.1.
An important implication of this fact is that the service provider always has an incentive to
upgrade the system's capacity by, for example, increasing the bandwidth W or implementing a
better error correction code to improve the characteristics of the efficiency function f(.).
Rf (X)
Figure 4-2: System throughput Rf(W) as a function of R. For t # 0, the operating point
is throughput maximizing and Pareto optimal, shown in the Figure. For any other operating
point, = 0.
Example 2: Consider the class of utility functions uj(x) = aj ln(1 + bjx), where aj and bj
are user dependent parameters. In this case Rj(x) = bjx < 1 implying that the SPE will bel+bjx ,implying that the SPE will be
Pareto optimal and throughput maximizing regardless of the values of aj and bj..
Example 3: Consider the class of utility functions uj(x) = ajxbJ, where aj and bj are user
dependent parameters, and 0 < bj < 1 for concavity. We have Rj (x) = bj - 1 < 1, so regardless
of the aj and bj, the SPE will be Pareto optimal and throughput maximizing. 
Example 4: Consider linear utility functions uj(x) = ajx + bj where aj > 0 and bj > 0.
Rj ( x) is not well defined for linear utility functions, but users with linear utilities have no risk
aversion, and are typically referred to as "risk-neutral." Therefore, we expect the SPE to be
efficient. For this case, Condition 1 of Proposition 18 simplifies to
aj +/ = 0.
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Therefore, pj # 0, proving that the outcome is throughput maximizing and Pareto optimal. ·
For classes of utility functions where Rj(x) < 1 is not guaranteed to hold for all j or for all
x, it is still possible that system throughput will be maximized. However, whether or not this
occurs will depend on the specific parameters of the utility functions.
Example 5: Consider the class of utility functions uj(x) = aj(1 - ebx). We have Rj (x) = bjx.
Thus, the SPE may not be system efficient. In the next section we will show that whether or
not this occurs depends on the specific values of the bj. ·
* 4.2 Characterization of the SPE
In this section, we explicitly characterize the SPE price. We also present examples which
demonstrate how we can characterize the SPE operating point.
4.2.1 SPE Price characterization
We first give the following preliminary result, which shows that if the SPE is efficient, then
the SPE price and rate vector must be uniquely defined.
Lemma 19.1 Consider an efficient SPE (q*, r*) of the Price-Rate Control Game with corre-
sponding SIR y*. There does not exist another efficient SPE (q, r).
Proof: By Proposition 8, f(-y*) = *f'(-*) if and only if
E rjf (y* ) = max{Rf (i)}-
To find a contradiction, suppose there exists another SPE (q, r) with corresponding SIR y such
that Erjf(-y) = maxR{Rf(W-)}. By Proposition 8, -y* y, and R* = R. If q Z q*, we have
q ri = qR # q*R* = q* r;,
which is a contradiction since an SPE must be profit maximizing. Therefore, q = q*. If ri r*
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for some i JSPE, then we have
q = u/(rif(-y))f(y) u(ri f(-Y ))f(`*) q,
which is a contradiction. O
Proposition 19. Let (q, r) be an SPE to the Rate Selection Game, with corresponding SIR y
and sum rate R. Let gj = rjf(-y) denote user j's effective data rate. Let JSPE = {jlrj > 0).
Then,
-Rf2( Y)l/jEsJSPE uj(rj7f()) 
Uj(r* (y*))f(`Y*),1'i
if f(Y) yf'(y), (4.2.1)
for any j, if f () = yft(3),
where r* and y* are defined in Lemma 19.1.
Proof: Using user j's first order optimality condition q = u(rjf(-y))f(3) = u(gj)f(y) and
(4.1.29) of F'roposition 18, we have
uj'(gj)gjf(-y) + q + Aju"j(gj)f(3) + pf(-y) = 0, i C JSPE-
This implies that
u3 (gj)gjf(y) + q + pf(y)
-uj(gj)f (Y )
Summing over j and (4.1.30), we have
je~SpEj EJ PE
which implies
jEJSPE
q + uj(gj)gjf(y) + f(3Y) 0
u j(gj)f (-) 0
uj(g,)f (Y) + gj + 9 = 0.j'(gj
Letting gj = rjf(-y), we have
q PE 1 1
Rf() + f( + ) -=0,
jESPE u(rf()) + jESPE uj(rf()) 
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from which we obtain
Rf2( )q = - JsPE 1 -- lf(Y). (4.2.2)
jEsJPE u'(f(f))
If f(y) -yf'(y), then p = 0 by the complementary slackness condition of (4.1.27); see [44]. If
f(y) = -yf'(y), then Lemma 19.1 applies. O
Proposition 19 shows that if f () yf'(y), the SPE price depends on the second derivatives
of the user utility functions. But surprisingly, if f('y) = yf'(y), this dependency no longer holds;
no matter what the second derivatives of the user utility functions are, the SPE price and rates
are uniquely defined.
4.2.2 Characterizing the SPE for efficient equilibria
In situations where the SPE is guaranteed to be efficient, such as when the relative risk
aversion condition of Proposition 18 holds, computing various quantities at the SPE is straight-
forward. One can solve the equation f(7) = yf'(y) to uniquely determine the SPE signal quality
. Furthermore, we have
WSPE sum rate of data transmission: fR =-,
SPE system throughput: f(~'),
SPE profit: R.
where q is given in Proposition 19.
Example 6: Assume the condition of Proposition 18 holds. We assume that W = 4.096 x 106
chips per second, and that the modulation scheme is non-coherent FSK with no error coding
and 50 bits per frame. This gives an efficiency function of
2y)
Then, we can calculate several system parameters with no other knowledge of the utility
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functions. Using the method described above, we have:
Signal quality: = 9.579
Frame success rate: fy) = 0.8119
Total uplink data transmission rate: E rj = 427.602 kbps.
Effective uplink data rate: E rjf(-) = 347.17 kbps.
These results hold for any utility functions, as long as they satisfy the condition of Proposi-
tion 18. For the special case of homogenous users, all the users will choose the same data rate
at equilibrium, and so they will each get an equal share of the net throughput. For 50 users,
this results in each user achieving an effective data rate of 6.943 kbps. ·
4.2.3 Characterizing the SPE for inefficient equilibria
Example 7: To illustrate the point that efficiency may or may not result if the utility functions
do not satisfy the condition of Proposition 18, we consider the family of utility functions from
Example 5. Specifically, we consider the case of homogeneous users and let
uj(x) = u(x) - e-K , V j.
For the systems parameters given in Example 6 and for 50 users, it can be shown that if
K < 1/6943, we will get a system and Pareto efficient solution, and the same numerical results
given in Section 4.2.2 apply. However, if K > 1/6943, each user's equilibrium effective data
rate will be 1/K. For example, if K = 1/500, then each user's equilibrium effective data rate
will be 500 bps, a significant loss of efficiency when compared to 6.943 kbps. In fact, there is
no theoretical limit on the efficiency loss, since choosing an arbitrarily large value of K under
this scenario can yield an arbitrarily small system throughput..
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Chapter 5
Extension to general networks
In this section, we consider the potential of applying the results of this thesis to the general
network setting, including wireline networks. Previous game theoretic models for general net-
works have modelled congestion by including an additive latency cost function in the user's
payoff (see, for example, [1] or [7] ). For the case of a single link shared by all users, the payoff
function is:
uj(rj ) - (R)rj - qrj, (5.0.1)
where 1(-) is a flow dependent latency function and l(R)rj represents the monetary cost incurred
by the user due to the congestion delays. This latency function depends on the sum data rate
of all users.
In this section, we show how the Wardrop Equilibrium characterization of Chapter 2 for
wireless cellular networks directly lends itself to the study of more general networks in which
multiple users access shared links. The resulting payoff function may be more natural than the
additive latency term given in Equation (5.0.1). Instead of viewing delays caused by congestion
as a separate cost in the payoff, we instead assume that congestion causes delays which reduce
the net throughput of the transmitter. Therefore, we consider a payoff of the form:
uj(rjC(R)) - qrj. (5.0.2)
where we refer to C(R) c (0, 1) as the congestion function, which scales the transmitted data
rate rj down to the realized throughput rjC(R).
We will show that for reasonable network models of protocols often used in general networks,
including wireline, the function C(R) satisfies exactly the same assumptions as the efficiency
function f(R), where for clarity we view f(.) as a function of R instead of Wy = .
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We illustrate the idea with an example.
Example 2: Consider the slotted Aloha multiple access protocol; see [6]. Let R represent the
rate of attempted transmissions and RC(R) represents the packet delivery rate. In a simple
ALOHA multiple access model, C(R) = e- R . This corresponds to an efficiency function of
C(R) f(7) = e- , which can be shown to satisfy Assumption 1. ·
The same procedure can be applied to more complex models of Aloha, such as unslotted
Aloha:
C(R) = e-2R
One can follow the method of Example 2 to find the equivalent efficiency function f (y), and
verify that Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Intuitively, the key similarity between wireless efficiency functions and congestion functions
like those mentioned is shown in Figure 5-1. This shows the system's total effective data rate
as a function of total data rate transmitted by the users. When the total input data rate
R is low, there is very little interference, and f(y) 1. Therefore, the total effective data
rate is approximately equal to the input data rate. This corresponds to the linear regime of
Figure 5-1, labelled as Region I. As the input data rate increases, the system suffers from more
interference, and the effective data rate is less than the input data rate; Region II. As the input
data rate continues to grow, interference levels result in the effective data rate decreasing, until
it eventually decays towards 0 in the limit; Region III.
This is the same phenomenon that occurs in typical general multiple access networks; a
general discussion of this is given in [48].
We note that viewing users are "congestion-takers" in wireline networks is a widely-used and
well-justified assumption (see, for example, [1]). Therefore, the Wardrop Equilibrium notion of
Chapter 2 extends to the case of these general networks.
Based on the preceding discussion, we see that the interference model developed for wireless
CDMA networks employing an SIR-balancing power control objective directly applies to other
network settings with the identification C(R) - f(R).
Rf(W)
RC(R)
Figure 5-1: The total effective data rate as a function of the total input rate.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and future directions
* 6.1 Main contributions
This thesis considers the problem of resource allocation in wireless cellular networks carry-
ing elastic data traffic. It follows in the footsteps of other authors who have used fundamental
economic principles, most notably pricing, the modeling of end-user behavior with utility func-
tions, and equilibrium analysis, in the study of other large scale engineering systems. Albeit
with slight difficulty due to the non-convex functional forms associated with the wireless setting,
the thesis showed that fundamental results seen in wireline networks also hold for the wireless
case considered here. Notably, there exists a price under which the network's limited resources
are used with full efficiency.
However. due to the unique characteristics of the wireless setting, this thesis shows surprising
results that would not be expected in the wireline network setting. In particular, profit max-
imizing pricing by a monopolist does not, in general, lead to a loss of efficiency. Expressed in
terms consistent with previous literature [1], there is no monopolist's markup from the Pigovian
tax for a broad class of utility functions.
To arrive at the results, we focus on the Wardrop Equlibrium notion. We first prove the
existence of a Nash Equilibrium, but show that this particular equilibrium notion suffered from
two flaws: lack of mathematical tractability, and extensive end-user information requirements
that make it impractical to implement. To address these issues, we shift focus to the Wardrop
Equilibrium notion by employing two well-known limiting arguments in conjunction: large
system analysis, taken from the spread spectrum wireless network literature, and replication,
taken from the economics literature.
The Wardrop Equilibrium, and the fact that a Pigovian tax exists, inspire a rate-control
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algorithm. Its stability properties are studied, and then improved upon with dynamic pricing.
* 6.2 A future direction
This thesis represents a first step in the application of pricing and equilibrium analysis to
wireless networks. While this thesis provided a comprehensive study for rate control in cellular
networks, the multi-hop wireless network case should prove to have a rich structure.
This thesis considers uplink in a cellular network, which gives rise to many simplifying
symmetries: All users attempt to use the same frequency band to send data to the same
destination. The max-min power control results in all users experiencing the same signal quality.
The limiting arguments used to arrive at the Wardrop Equilibrium notion result in all users
having the same marginal impact on the system's SIR; the notion of a "bottleneck user" is
swept away in the limit.
As a result, one can think of this as a single resource problem. In full analogy with wireline
networks, it is as if there is a single wired link that goes to the base station, and all users
transmit on, and congest, this link. The extension presented in Chapter 5 adds rigor to this
viewpoint.
Literature in wireline networks has shown that if one is allowed to choose a price for each
link in the network, efficiency gains can be realized. Due to the single link interpretation of the
cellular system studied in this thesis, it is not surprising that only one price was required to
achieve efficiency.
The most interesting future direction involves breaking the symmetry by allowing there to
be multiple destinations and routing choices for the transmitters. For multiple destinations, it
is reasonable to expect that each destination will need to have its own price in order to achieve
efficiency. If nodes are also given flexibility to make routing decisions, we can expect another
layer of heterogeneous pricing to emerge in order to achieve efficiency.
Finally, this thesis was restricted to elastic data users. There are fundamental differences
in the behavior of transmitters of elastic data versus inelastic data; see Chapter 1.4. There
will undoubtedly be numerous mathematical challenges in extending this kind of analysis to the
step utility functions associated with transmitters of inelastic data.
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This thesis provides another example of how the study of a network based on pricing,
utility functions, and equilibrium analysis can lead to algorithms with very low communication
overhead, but which differentiate the service offered to users with heterogeneous preferences. A
unifying framework in this context must extend these features to general network topologies and
include both elastic and inelastic traffic streams. If successful, such a framework will provide
the backdrop for promising resource allocation algorithms and protocols.
Chapter 7
Appendix
* 7.1 Appendix A
In this appendix, we recall the background for basic results in game theory and stability
analysis.
7.1.1 Nash Equilibrium and its existence
See [40] for a thorough coverage of game theory concepts.
Definition 11. (Quasiconcavity) Let f be a function defined over a convex set S. Let Uc
{x Sjf(x) c denote the upper level set of f for c. The function f is quasiconcave if U, is
convex for all c.
A pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is an action profile in which no player can improve his
payoff through unilateral deviation. Formally:
Definition 12. (Nash Equilibrium) A Nash Equilibrium of the Rate Selection Game under
price q is a vector r* [0, rmax] such that for all j
uj (rjf (y (r; rj))) - qrj > uj(jf(y(; rj)))- q, for all Tj C [O, rmax].
Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem is commonly used to prove the existence of a Nash Equi-
librium.
Proposition 20. (Kakutani) Consider a mapping f : A -- A, where A is a nonempty, convex,
compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. If f(x) is nonempty for all x E A, if
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f(x) is convex for all x E A, and if f(x) has a closed graph, then there exists a fixed point
x f(x).
The following existence Proposition follows from Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem.
Proposition 21. Consider a game with J players, where each player j chooses an action aj in
some action space Aj, and receives and a payoff function uj(a). If Aj is a nonempty, convex,
and compact subset of a Euclidean space, and if uj(aj; a_j) is continuous in a and quasiconcave
in ai, then there exists a Nash Equilibrium.
7.1.2 Stability of dynamic systems
This section defines terms and gives preliminary results relevant to the stability analysis
presented in Chapter 3. Unless otherwise stated, the material is paraphrased from [8].
Suppose that the discrete time system
x(k + 1)= f(x(k)), (7.1.1)
has an equilibrium point x*. Without loss of generality, assume x* = 0 (if the equilibrium is
at any other value, the following will hold after a change of variables that moves the equilibrium
to the origin). We have the following definition.
Definition 13. A system is locally stable around its equilibrium point (at the origin) if it
satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Given any > 0, there exists 61 > 0 such that if IIx(ko)ll < 61, then Ilx(t)l < , for all
t > to.
2. There exists 62 > 0 such that if Ix(to)ll < 2, then x(t) - 0 as t - oo.
Write
f(x) = hx + e(x),
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where h is the Jacobian associated with the linearization of (7.1.1) and e(x) denotes higher
order terms; i.e.,
lim Ile(x)11 0.
lxII-0 I lxlI
We refer to the system
x(k + 1) = hx(k), (7.1.2)
as the linearized system. We have the following.
Proposition 22. If the linearized system (7.1.2) is locally stable, then the equilibrium point
of the system (7.1.1) is locally stable.
Proposition 23. Consider a linear system of the form (7.1.2), and let A1,..., An denote the
eigenvalues of h. If Ail < 1 for all i, then the system is locally stable.
* 7.2 Appendix B
In this section, we justify Assumption 1.5, stated here for convenience.
Assumption 1.5 Let C e RT+, and let h(x) - f ( 1 x). There exists x such that Vx < , h(x)
is strictly convex, and Vx > x, h(x) is strictly concave.
First, we show that this assumption is needed for the proof of Proposition 2, Lemma 2.3.
Consider the following function f:
f(x) =
x2, x<.5
x-.25, .5 < x < .9
(7.2.1)
10x - 8.35, .9 < x < .935
1, x > .935
Although f violates Assumptions 1.1 and 1.4, one can construct a function f which is a
constinuously differentiable approximation of f; i.e. an e-perturbed version of f that satis-
fies Assumptions 1.1-1.5 by "smoothing" the corners of f and slightly convexifying the linear
portions.
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f(x
Figure 7-1: The function f(x).
Let h(x) f( 1 xC), and let h(x) = f( 1 x). h(x) is plotted for C = 1. For our purposes,
it is enough to note that h(x) will look like h(x) with rounded corners. The proof of Lemma
2.3 relied on the fact that there is only one point on the he(x) curve which is a tangent point
to a line passing through the origin. h(x) will have 3 such points; the corresponding points
on h(x) are marked by arrows. Since each of these points corresponds to a stationary point of
rjf-( ), Lemma 2.3 does not follow. In fact, by plotting rjf(j) for W = 1, C = 1,
one can see that one of the stationary points is a local minimum and the other two are local
maxima, implying that the function is not quasiconcave.
However, Assumption 1.5 is natural for efficiency functions. It can be proven for all efficiency
functions with no error correction codes in which the bit error rate decays exponentially as a
function of y, and can be shown by simulation for other efficiency functions.
Proposition 24. Consider any modulation scheme with BER Ae - B , where A and B are
positive constants. Then, Assumption 1.5 holds.
Proof: In this case, we have
f 1 ) = (1 - AeBx)M (7.2.2)
1 x)
After taking the second derivative of (7.2.2), setting it equal to 0, and simplifying, we have the
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Figure 7-2: The function h(x).
following condition:
e- lc (A(M- 1)+ 1)-1 (1 -e ) 2C(1 + Cx). (7.23)
Proving that Assumption 1.5 holds is equivalent to showing that there is one unique point
satisfying (7.2.3). The left hand side of (7.2.3) is strictly positive for x = 0 (recall that M > 1
by assumption), and is strictly decreasing for all x > 0. The right hand side is 0 for x = 0, and
is strictly increasing and unbounded for x > 0. Therefore, there is a unique value i for which
(7.2.3) holds. []
* 7.3 Appendix C
In order for the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be necessary at an optimal solution to
an optimization problem of the form (4.1.25) - (4.1.27), all equality constraint gradients and
active inequality constraint gradients must be linearly independent. In this section, we prove
this linear independence.
The constraint gradients of (4.1.26) and (4.1.27) are given in the following matrix; the the
ij th entry is the partial derivative of the ith constraint with respect to the jth variable. Rows 1
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to J correspond to constraint (4.1.26), row J + 1 corresponds to constraint (4.1.27), columns 1
to J correspond to the variables gl to gj, and column J + 1 corresponds to the variable k.
u (g1) 0 0 -.. 0 -1
0 U2(g2) 0 ... 0 -1
0 0 ... u(gJ) -1
1 1 1 ... 1 0
Let ai denote the ith column vector. To find a contradiction, assume that there exists
A, ..., Aj such that EJ=1 Ajaj = aJ+l. Since ai(J+ 1) = 1 for all i = 1,..., J, and aj+1(J+ 1) =
0, it must be that Ai < 0 for some i = 1, ..., J. Since Aiui'(gi) = -1, it follows that u'(gi) > 0.
This contradicts Assumption 2.2. Therefore, the matrix A is full rank, and the rows are linearly
independent. El
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